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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

- 4 APR 1975

Refer to I-35080/75

Mr. Laurence Legere  
Defense Advisor  
US Mission to NATO  
Autoroute Brussels ZAVENTUM  
Brussels, Belgium

Dear Larry,

(U) In accordance with the practice we have followed in the past, you will find attached a copy of the minutes from the recent Nuclear Planning Group meeting held in Brussels, Belgium on 10 December 1974. This copy is for your information and retention.

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*  
D. P. McAuliffe  
Major General, USA  
Director, European Region

Attachment: a/s  
I-35080/75, cy 15

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Prepd by: Col. J.G. Callaway, 48870, x79682:jgb/4Apr75  
ISA/ED/NPA

*334 Nuclear Planning Group 4 Apr 1975*

08-M-1077-A1



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 MAR 1975

Refer to: I-35080/75

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - ACTION MEMORANDUM (U)

(U) Attached for your approval is the Memorandum of Conversation of the 16th Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels, Belgium on 10 December 1974. The individuals who took the notes during the Ministers' discussions are listed below:

USMISSION NATO

Mr. John A. Woodworth

STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. Gerald Helman  
Mr. Les Brown  
Mr. Robert Collins

((Signed) Harry E. Bergold

HARRY E. BERGOLD, JR.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
European & NATO Affairs

Attachment: as stated  
MemCon of NPG 16th Meeting

APPROVE  Assistant Secretary of Defense

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

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Prepd by: Col. J.G. Callaway, 4B-870, x-79682:jgb/17-3-75  
ED/NPA

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334 Nuclear Planning Group 21 March 1975

**OASD/ISA INTRAOFFICE CONTROL SHEET**

DATE  
17 March 1975

LOG NO.  
1-35080/75

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation

NAME, DIRECTORATE, EXTENSION, AND SIGNATURE OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL:

Col. Jack G. Callaway, ED/NPA, x-79675

		INITIAL	DATE		INITIAL	DATE
4	ASSISTANT SECRETARY	S		DASD NE, AF&SA AFF	N	
3	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	XO		DIR, NE&SA REG	NE	
	ASST FOR ADMINISTRATION	AO		DIR, AFRICAN REG	NA	
	RECORDS & CONTROL	RC				
	DEP FOR MC&TO	TO		DASD-P/PL&NSC AFF	P	
	PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT	SA		DIR, P/PL&NSC AFF	PD	
	SP ADV (POW AFF)	PW		NSC COORD	PN	
	CONF ASST TO ASD	CA		DIR, MBFR TF	PF	
	DIR, LAW OF SEA TF	LS				
	SPEC ASST (NUCLEAR POLICY)	RS				
	PRINCIPAL DASD	D		DASD FOR SA	M	
	MILITARY ASST	DM		DIR, SA PLANS & POLICY	MD	
	SPEC ASST FOR CONG REL	DS		PLANS & PROGRAMS DIV	MP	
	SPEC ASST TO POASD	DT		POLICY DIV	MN	
	DASD FOR EA&PAC AFF	A		DEF SCTY ASST AGCY		
	DIR, EA&PAC REG	AD		DIRECTOR	T	
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				SPEC ASST	TB	
2	DASD EUR&NATO AFF	E	2 21	COMPTROLLER	TC	
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				DIR FOR SALES NEG	TS	
	DASD I-A, FTD&MR AFF	I				
	DIR, I-A REGION	IA		DASD - INT'L ECON AFFAIRS	B	
	DIR, FMR AFFAIRS	IF		DIRECTOR, IEA	BD	
	DIR, ST&D	IT				

**COORDINATION OUTSIDE ISA**

ACTIVITY	NAME AND TITLE	INITIAL	DATE
GENERAL COUNSEL			
THE JOINT STAFF			
DEPT OF STATE			

REMARKS (Including Coordination Outside ISA Not Shown Above)

(Signed)  
Robert Ellsworth  
Assistant Secretary of Defense

24 MAR 1975

SUSPENSE DATE

(Drafting Office and Officers)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 10, 1974

SUBJECT: Sixteenth Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group

PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium

PARTICIPANTS: See attached list.

COPIES TO:

NOTE ON DISSEMINATION AND ACCESS

In accordance with understandings among the United States and the other NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) member nations, discussions conducted in the NPG are privileged, and documentation related to such discussions is to be made available only to a very limited number of personnel in each member country who have a direct need-to-know. Specifically, the NPG countries have agreed that no formal verbatim or summary records of the NPG meetings will be kept, although individual countries are permitted to take notes for their own use, if they so desire. The US notes on the December 1974 NPG meeting are contained in this NOFORN Memorandum of Conversation.

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NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
16TH MEETING - NATO HEADQUARTERS, BELGIUM

OPENING REMARKS -- 10 DECEMBER 1974

The NPG convened at 1620, December 10 in the Presentation Room at NATO Headquarters, Brussels. Secretary General Luns welcomed the various Ministers and other representatives and extended a particular welcome to new participants. He said he hoped the new participants would find the NPG to be a rewarding institution in providing the forum for consultations on sensitive nuclear issues in a select group. SYG Luns said that he assumed all understood the difficulties which required the NPG to meet at this time in Brussels (NATO Headquarters) and to address an agenda limited in subject matter and scope but he hoped that no precedent was thereby established.

SYG Luns invited Secretary Schlesinger to provide a strategic briefing and noted that the classification for the briefing would be COSMIC TOP SECRET ATOMAL.

AGENDA ITEM I - STRATEGIC BALANCE BRIEFING

Secretary Schlesinger thanked SYG Luns. He began his briefing by stating that there have been major changes in the nuclear environment. The single most important change was the Vladivostok understanding and the manner in which that understanding reads back into MBFR. Vladivostok had a happy consequence insofar as FBS are concerned, and regarding which we received such good advice from the Allies. SALT developments will also require the Allies to get into the question of whether a nuclear element should be introduced into MBFR. Secretary Schlesinger recalled, as a background factor, that the Nunn Amendments require the United States to produce a rationale for its nuclear posture in Europe. This effort will find a feedback into the nature of an MBFR nuclear element. The U.S. attitude in this regard can be described as wanting to maintain in Europe a very ample tactical nuclear capability. Any adjustments in nuclear warheads in Europe should insure that the nuclear posture of the Alliance is enhanced and not diminished. Thus, the Secretary said, before making any recommendation under the Nunn Amendments, the U.S. will consult with the Allies. In this regard, the Secretary noted the SYG's parallel study on the Nunn report.

Turning in more detail to the Vladivostok agreement, Secretary Schlesinger said that it potentially entails a ceiling on central strategic systems until 1985. The Vladivostok understanding calls for equal aggregates of nuclear delivery vehicles. In contrast to SALT I, the numbers arrived at are higher and are symmetrical and include bombers. The agreement calls for further reductions, which if they occur will maintain the principle of equality. Furthermore, there is freedom to mix. There is some constraint in that the restraints on silos contained in SALT I are carried over to SALT II but this will have no effect on total numbers. The Vladivostok understanding calls for 1320 MIRVed vehicles. The number basically is a U.S. suggestion and allows the U.S. to deploy TRIDENT-POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III as planned. There are no restrictions on mobile ICBMs.

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In the latter connection, Secretary Schlesinger noted that the Soviets have in development a mobile ICBM and that would mean an important change. This should not be surprising, in that the Soviets have repeatedly in the past told us that they would do under SALT I what they could do. He noted that there was a U.S. unilateral statement in 1972 that any deployment by the USSR of mobile missiles would be considered inconsistent with SALT I. It is not clear, however, what the status of that unilateral statement is today. The Secretary further noted that the SRAM missiles on B-1 and B-52 bombers have ranges less than 600 miles and would thus not be included in totals under a SALT II agreement. There is no limit on throw-weight and no limit on bomber payload. There is no limit on new models and replacement except on MIRVed systems. Finally, Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, despite powerful Soviet blandishments there is no inclusion of FBS systems in SALT II. Parenthetically, the Secretary noted that FBS is a Soviet term which he would prefer to see dropped.

The Secretary said that it is the decision to drop FBS which should reassure the Allies, who have adopted a position in this regard with which the Secretary strongly agrees. FBS are in no way constrained under SALT II and continue to provide an opportunity for NATO to influence the Soviet military posture in Eastern Europe.

Secretary Schlesinger displayed a slide which was a comparison of first-line non-central launchers. The Secretary commented that the Soviets have always complained that forward-based systems threatened the Soviet heartland. However, this complaint has not been borne out by the facts. The Soviets have about as many non-central systems as the Allies. There is no obvious difference between the two.

The Secretary then turned to a slide dealing with the current Soviet posture on SALT. He recalled that the Soviets have followed a hard line on negotiations. They have always asserted that the numbers contained in SALT I were equitable and should be continued in SALT II. In addition, the Soviets have put forward other unsound and illogical propositions. Their logic was faulty on non-central systems. It is clear that there is no reason to compensate the Soviets in this regard. The Soviets have also demanded compensation from the U.S. for the nuclear weapons of its NATO Allies. They have maintained and argued since 1972 to the effect that if the UK and France deployed nuclear submarines, the Soviet Union would have to take compensatory measures. But the Soviets have dropped that position. It was an illogical position in any event because the Soviets did not offer to include Soviet systems aimed at the UK and France. Soviet illogic showed in a third way. The USSR has been having trouble with the Chinese and so the Soviets had to argue for compensation with respect to the Chinese. However, the U.S.-Chinese-Soviet relationship is trilateral and nowhere did the Soviets imply that the U.S. as well as the USSR might need compensation with respect to any growing Chinese nuclear threat. There are other areas of SALT negotiations on which the Soviets took an illogical position. For example, the Soviets wanted to exclude the B-1 and TRIDENT as "new" systems but sought to include some of their systems which were under development. However, President Ford took a firm position that there would be equal aggregates and rejected all illogical Soviet positions.

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Secretary Schlesinger next addressed Slide 1-27 which showed some of the problems that might arise in SALT II by 1980-85 and some of the solutions that might be developed. With this as a backdrop he discussed the advantages for the U.S. in the SALT agreement. One such advantage is that the U.S. made clear it would not sign a non-equal treaty in terms of numbers. In 1972, a technological advantage enjoyed by the U.S. justified inferior U.S. numbers. However given projections in development of Soviet technology, by 1985 the U.S. advantage would fade and so the U.S. had to insist on equal aggregates. Secretary Schlesinger further recalled that achieving arms balance is easier than achieving stability. Arms balance comes from equal aggregates. Stability means holding down numbers of forces so that they do not have the capability to threaten one another. It was necessary for stability towards 1985 for the U.S. to get arms balance, and that is what President Ford achieved. But, equal aggregates do have the potential of higher costs. However, there was no arms balance achieved through limiting such matters as throw-weight. To insist upon achieving arms balance would have necessitated difficult negotiations and, in any event, the Soviet approach to arms control is not sophisticated. They do not seem to understand what is involved.

Secretary Schlesinger called for questions.

Defense Minister Vanden Boeynants (Belgium) commented that at first glance the results of SALT seemed substantial. But the basic question of control remains. He noted that we are all practical men and know that agreements can be made but the real problem is how to insure that they are lived up to. How will the agreements be supervised and how will they be carried out in practice? If there can be guarantees on that score, it is fair to say that the SALT understanding is a substantial agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger responded by noting that decisions at Vladivostok do not constitute an agreement as yet but the framework or outline for one to be signed hopefully in June-July 1975. In the meantime, the U.S. will be engaged in setting up a system of verification. In that connection, Secretary Schlesinger said he cannot assume that every small violation by the Soviet Union of an agreement will be detected. But, he can say that there will be a system set up so there will be a high degree of confidence that any substantial violation will be detected. Turning to the question of detecting numbers, Secretary Schlesinger said that to be MIRVed a missile must be tested. If the Soviet Union MIRV's a missile without testing, it risks losing in the neighborhood of 10-15 billion dollars in development costs if the missile fails. The Soviets have shown considerable caution in how they invest their R and D funds. Thus, the U.S. will be watching tests on the SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 and sea-based missiles to see whether they are tested in the MIRVed mode. If they are, we are certain to detect the test. If successfully tested in the MIRVed mode, then the U.S. will be entitled to assume that all such missiles deployed are MIRVed. Thus, in deploying the SS-X-19 -- which is just over the point of successful testing -- we will count all SS-X-19's deployed as MIRVed. And we will monitor various missile fields to see what missiles are deployed. If the Soviets say they are not MIRVed, our intention is to say that all systems successfully tested as MIRVed must be counted as MIRVed. Secretary Schlesinger commented that the

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question of monitoring numbers is a little more ambiguous because it may involve mobile ICBMs which are not now known to be deployed. But mobile missiles can only be deployed in certain areas and we will monitor those areas so that we can make an estimate against the total. We may miss 25-40 missiles, but any substantial deployment of mobile ICBMs would be discovered. The Secretary said it is important to recall that in arriving at numbers, the Soviet Union allowed the U.S. to achieve a larger force than it had before, whereas the Soviets had to take a small reduction. In concluding his response, Secretary Schlesinger reaffirmed that the U.S. will not sign an agreement unless there is a high confidence in our ability to monitor.

Minister Leber (Federal Republic of Germany) assumed that U.S. missile accuracies remain greater than those of Soviet systems despite the larger throw-weight of the latter. Can we assume that the Soviets will attempt greater missile accuracies, and that the U.S. will attempt to match Soviet throw-weights? In concluding, Minister Leber noted that a new political element existed in the strategic equation. This might be termed as the third stage of nuclear development. The first stage featured the U.S. nuclear monopoly with Alliance strategy based on massive retaliation. The second phase came with Soviet possession of nuclear weapons at which time "flexible response" -- which required more attention to conventional forces -- became the Alliance's strategy. Stage III might be called the "Vladivostok stage", and represents a political process of the greatest importance since it is predicated upon a de facto parity in the strategic forces of both sides -- a parity which is admitted and accepted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Minister Leber asked if the Vladivostok agreement would mean a change in the strategic concept although he assumed that the existing concept would remain valid. Noting that the importance of conventional forces had grown in the second phase he had referred to above, Minister Leber suggested that conventional strength would grow even more important with the advent of agreed strategic parity which meant, in effect, a strategic stalemate. Thus, the Allies must recognize that their defense requirements will permit no slippage in the Alliance's conventional strength.

Secretary Schlesinger agreed with Minister Leber's conclusion about the importance of maintaining conventional strength and with the rationale which supported that conclusion. In response to Minister Leber's second question, the Secretary replied that a new strategy was not required by the Vladivostok agreement. The adoption of new targetting doctrine for U.S. strategic forces was important in this context. Assuming that the strategic balance remains the same, the new doctrine will permit U.S. strategic forces to cover targets of interest to Europe, and will be sufficient to cover the requirements for deterrence against threats to both Europe and the United States. The NATO Triad Concept is still valid, therefore, and no change in strategy is needed.

Secretary Schlesinger also pointed out that the Soviets would not be able to effectively absorb their new strategic systems until the 1980's since they will need time to develop the operational plans and programs for these systems. As he had in past NPG meetings, the Secretary reminded the Allies that the Soviets would have operational problems with new MIRV technologies.

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Concerning Minister Leber's question about the differences in accuracy and throw-weight of U.S. and Soviet strategic systems, the Secretary pointed out that the U.S. continues to have an edge in accuracy. The U.S. had "sleek" RV's while Soviet RV's are blunt and more subject to buffeting by winds and the effects of varying air densities. Thus, Soviet accuracies were at a more primitive level but were improving and by the early 1980's would be impressive by present standards.

The Secretary noted that the Soviets are deploying missiles with larger throw-weights: the SS-X-18 has a throw-weight of 16,000 pounds while the SS-X-19 MIRV system has a throw-weight of 6,000 pounds. The SS-X-19 has a throw-weight three to four times larger than its predecessor, the SS-11.

Referring to a question from Minister Vanden Boeynants (Belgium), Secretary Schlesinger noted there might be some "intellectual reassurance" in realizing that the Soviet deployment of missiles with larger throw-weights in a sense constituted a "quasi-violation" of the 1972 Interim Agreement. What the Soviets had in fact violated was a 1972 unilateral definition by the U.S. that it would consider as a "heavy missile" any new missile which had a larger volume than previously-deployed heavy missiles. The SS-X-19 is more than 50 percent larger than the SS-11 and thus constitutes a violation of the United States' unilateral definition. Its deployment indicates that the Soviets are prepared to push the outer edges of what is acceptable under the SALT agreements. With the added throw-weight of their new missiles, the Soviets could have 7-8,000 MIRV's in the one MT range if they MIRV their entire force. This could give them a significant counter-force capability which the U.S. will have to watch very carefully. The United States can live with some disproportions in relative throw-weight capabilities so long as the overall matching of forces leaves the U.S. and its Allies undiminished security. In this context, the U.S. should retain its lead in SLBMs over the future and this should help compensate for Soviet ICBM growth. If SLBMs and strategic bombers do not provide sufficient compensation against Soviet strategic forces, the U.S. is prepared to move into an ICBM with a heavier throw-weight (either a new missile for the MINUTEMAN III silo, or a land-mobile missile).

Secretary Schlesinger stressed that the U.S. must maintain essential equivalence and that the Soviets must never feel that an advantage can be exploited in the strategic area.

Minister Mason (UK) thanked the Secretary for his statement and noted that the Vladivostok agreement might represent a significant "step ahead". He observed that, so far as MIRV's were concerned, the Vladivostok agreement provided nothing on verification nor was the U.S. seeking a MIRV verification arrangement by some other means. He noted that MIRV developments could be satisfactorily controlled by national monitoring of MIRV-testing. The "capping" of the strategic arms competition by the Vladivostok agreement might prompt a "qualitative" strategic race with more costly and technologically sophisticated weapons. Minister Mason asked if the Vladivostok agreement affected the U.S. freedom to deploy MARV's. He also asked if strategic bombers had been specifically defined in the Vladivostok agreement (since payload was not affected, had some other definition been set, e.g. range?).

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Secretary Schlesinger replied that U.S. development of MARV's was not constrained by the Vladivostok agreement. He agreed with Minister Mason that there would be competition on qualitative nuclear elements. He added that no effective way existed to monitor all qualitative elements. For example, if we had declared that neither side should have weapons with greater accuracy than one-quarter mile CEP, there would be no way to monitor compliance with such a criterion. The Secretary pointed out that the nuclear developments unleashed at Alamogordo could only be channeled and controlled, not made to disappear. The world must, therefore, be prepared to live with the major powers adjusting to the dynamics of the strategic situation. This did not constitute an "arms race". Indeed, some features, such as missile silo-hardening technology, were desirable because they contributed to stability and security. But there will be qualitative competition, said the Secretary, and the Allies must be prepared to adjust to it and to live with it since there was no inherent "balance of terror" that, once believed, could be left alone. Thus there will be changes as technology changes. The Soviets would certainly not issue a "self-denying ordinance" foregoing the advantages of technological change in strategic weaponry.

In responding to another of Minister Mason's questions, Secretary Schlesinger said that ambiguities remain on just what a "strategic" bomber is. The U.S. identified as strategic those forces that could attack the U.S. from the Soviet Union or which could attack the Soviet Union from the U.S. Any system that did not have the above capability was, by definition, non-strategic. Such definitions were not altogether satisfactory, however. For example, the U.S. must watch Soviet tanker/refueling capabilities very closely to guarantee that systems currently defined as non-strategic do not, through refueling, obtain a capability to strike targets in the United States. Such ambiguities will be the subject of further discussion in the SALT talks. As an additional example, Secretary Schlesinger noted that the BACKFIRE bomber might have the capability to hit some U.S. targets (it could do so very handily from Arctic air bases), but it was not fair to assume from this that BACKFIRE was being deployed as a strategic system. Such ambiguities force us to look carefully at even minor degrees and differences.

In a further description of the Vladivostok Agreement, Secretary Schlesinger noted that it did not constrain either FBS or other Alliance-related systems. It did, however, provide for a common ceiling on strategic systems. It was quite possible, therefore, that the Allies should argue for Soviet acceptance of a similar ceiling in Central Europe.

Referring to Slide #2 which concerned the strategic balance, the Secretary noted the three criteria for preservation of the strategic balance:

-- An assured second strike capability. The Secretary pointed out, as he had said before, that under the new targetting doctrine weapons would not be unleashed at the outset of a conflict against urban/industrial targets, but could be withheld during the opening phases to present a risk which might prompt Soviet agreement to a satisfactory conclusion of the conflict.

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-- The United States would make any adjustments required to maintain essential equivalence and was, if necessary, prepared to go to a "quadriad" nuclear force structure in which land-based mobile missiles would be added to existing systems. From a political standpoint, it was important that a perceived parity be maintained between the two major strategic forces so that everyone -- not just the Soviets, but the NATO Allies, Japan, and others as well -- understand that essential equivalence continues to exist.

In describing new Soviet systems, Secretary Schlesinger noted that the Soviets were testing four new ICBMs. The U.S. assumed the first of these would be deployed in the first quarter of 1975. These systems represent major new Soviet capabilities. The SS-X-18 can carry either one warhead with a 25 MT yield or, in a MIRVed version, eight warheads of about 1½ MT each. On the SS-X-18 and 19, the U.S. anticipated a CEP in the range of one-quarter mile. While work on the SS-X-16 has been delayed, this system is being developed as a possible mobile launcher and for insertion in existing SS-13 silos. Referring to the next slide, Secretary Schlesinger referred to development of the SS-N-18 missile, which had a range of 4,000 miles, to "cold-launch" test facilities and to a GOLF-class missile-test submarine with six launch tubes.

Referring to the next slide, the Secretary said that, beyond the SS-N-8 missile, the Soviet submarine force was also growing. Thus a new version of the DELTA-class submarine had sixteen rather than twelve launch tubes. The Soviets also are working on a larger, lengthened DELTA-class submarine with eighteen, twenty or twenty-two launch tubes. With the number of launch tubes growing, the Soviets will reach the 950 number limit set for SLBMs under the 1972 agreement with 62 submarines. The new Soviet deployments indicate that the Soviets are willing to make the effort required to improve their strategic forces. In response to a question, the Secretary pointed out that the U.S. TRIDENT submarine would carry 24 missiles with a higher throw-weight than that of the Soviets' SS-N-8.

Referring to the next slide, Secretary Schlesinger described a possible Soviet mobile ICBM which had been seen at Plesetsk. Possible prototypes of other mobile systems had been seen at Volgograd. Thus the Soviets were experimenting with land-mobile systems, but the U.S. did not know how serious they were about such systems.

Referring to Slide D-8-A, the Secretary noted the features of the BACKFIRE bomber which the Soviets had begun to operationally deploy with Soviet air and naval forces.

Referring to U.S. programs, Secretary Schlesinger commented on a photograph of the roll-out ceremonies for the B-1 bomber (slide 4), and said that the U.S. hoped to have the first B-1 flight-test before the end of 1974. He noted that the B-1 represented a very impressive, if costly, weapon system which is better than the B-52 since it has a low radar-cross section and is equipped for the nuclear environment.

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In reviewing a slide (#5) comparing the B-1 with other aircraft, the Secretary noted that the B-1 was smaller than the B-52 but bigger than the FB-111 which, in turn, is smaller than the BACKFIRE. He added that the FB-111 was not covered in the Vladivostok Agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger noted that the U.S. was now building the first TRIDENT submarine. The TRIDENT had 24 launch tubes to the POSEIDON's 16. The missile holes were also larger in the TRIDENT and therefore larger missiles could be deployed. Two such missiles were under development, the TRIDENT I (C-4) and the TRIDENT II (D-5). The C-4 can be retro-fitted into the POSEIDON submarine, thus extending the range of its missile capability. The D-5 could be deployed only in the TRIDENT and would expand SLBM throw-weight. Indeed, the D-5 might be the cheapest way to expand U.S. missile throw-weight capability if that should appear necessary.

Secretary Schlesinger noted that in his 1973 budget presentation to the Congress, he had suggested that the U.S. would be prepared to alter the TRIDENT program in favor of the small NARWHAL-class submarine if the Soviets showed restraint in their strategic systems. The Soviets had not shown such restraint, and the U.S. would go ahead with TRIDENT as planned. He then displayed a slide with the characteristics of the TRIDENT submarine.

Secretary Schlesinger noted that the U.S. had originally planned 2200 strategic vehicles. The Vladivostok Agreement permits 2400; thus the U.S. would plan to deploy more bombers and SLBMs and to retain ICBM-levels at the current number of 1050. Accordingly, the United States would retain the POLARIS SSBN during its entire potential lifetime and would retain the B-52 G and H model aircraft all the way through the 1980's. As a replacement bomber comes along, the U.S. would drop B-52 D's from the inventory. Secretary Schlesinger stressed that the U.S. planned to come up to the numerical levels permitted in the Vladivostok Agreement. It is important that the U.S. do this since if the Soviets feel the United States is not prepared to come up to the maximum level permitted by the Vladivostok Agreement, they will have no incentive to negotiate possible reductions in strategic forces.

Secretary Schlesinger noted that the Vladivostok Agreement represented substantial progress toward an adequate degree of arms control. It had positive aspects for NATO, and it meant that there was a ceiling on the number of strategic systems rather than an open-ended competition as in the past. Moreover, the agreement showed that both the U.S. and Soviet Union could live with a degree of strategic stability. The Vladivostok Agreement did open questions about non-central systems and what approach should be taken toward them in MBFR. The Secretary said that the U.S. would be studying these questions in the months to come as would the Allies. The studies would prepare for results in MBFR, if that were the wish of all the Allies.

Secretary General Luns closed discussion on the strategic item with a statement of thanks to Secretary Schlesinger.

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AGENDA ITEM 11 - NUNN AMENDMENT

SYG Luns introduced agenda item 11, noting that the staff was prepared to start work on a draft assessment as soon as the Military Committee had completed its work. He then asked Secretary Schlesinger if he would lead off the discussion.

Secretary Schlesinger noted that there were two aspects of the Nunn Amendment: One having to do with the reduction of support forces and the authorization to convert the spaces into combat forces, the other having to do with theater nuclear weapons.

On the support-to-combat aspect, U.S. Congressional actions should be viewed as an antidote to Mansfield tendencies, encouraging us to do what we should be doing anyway. The effect would be entirely beneficial, although there were some reverberations from the Soviet Union. The USSR had hoped, by waiting, to see a gradual erosion of the U.S. presence in Europe, through Congressional action. This waiting game has been spoiled by the Nunn action and Brezhnev had complained to the President about it at Vladivostok. The President had responded by noting that if the Soviets were so concerned they should get on with MBFR, at which point Brezhnev changed the subject.

A second point worth noting is that the Soviets have moved toward a freeze on force levels. Since the USSR had increased its force levels by 100,000 since 1968, we might respond to Soviet insistence on a freeze by suggesting a freeze at levels existing as of 1 January 1968.

On the nuclear aspect of the Nunn Amendment, we have, of course, been considering a nuclear option in MBFR and the Nunn Amendment may provide an additional inducement in that direction. All should understand, however, that the Nunn Amendment does not require us to make reductions in the stockpile. The requirement is only that of developing a rationale for the warheads deployed abroad, and does not deal with delivery systems. The number of warheads in Europe, to be blunt, has become a political symbol. We should be prepared, however, to make any adjustments that seem desirable for military reasons, particularly if we can get something for these reductions in MBFR.

Many of the weapons in the present inventory date from the 1950's and early 1960's and are obsolescent. Moreover, when they were deployed there was less concern than now for their vulnerability and we had little of the air mobility that we have today. In addition, we will have, before long, between 8-10,000 warheads available in strategic systems which are far less vulnerable than theater nuclear weapons. We can improve our military posture by making some of these warheads available to SACEUR. In short, what we need to do is approach the question of our weapons' deployments in NATO with detachment and objectivity.

Minister Leber (FRG) took the floor to thank the Secretary for his explanation. He expressed his agreement that an analysis of the stockpile would be useful and that he had no objection to such an effort. He wanted, however, to pose a question about the 1 April deadline required for the Congressional report -- a deadline that was well known to the Soviets. To pose the hypothetical

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question, suppose we decided that some reductions could be usefully made without harm to our military capabilities, what would be the tactical utility of the Nunn Amendment vis-a-vis the Soviet Union? The problem is that the pressure is on the West. There is no pressure on the USSR to offer up anything; it can await presentation of the study to Congress and then sit back and wait for subsequent reductions.

Minister Mason (UK) interjected to say he wished to raise a related question. Noting that he too appreciated the utility of the study, he feared the nuclear card would be played before we could even get to the negotiating table. There would be no time for the NPG to look at the study and the conclusions contained in it. When they were revealed, as one must assume they would be by Congress, the nuclear option would be robbed of any weight and significance. The question of the presentation of the report on 1 April, therefore, would be extremely important.

SYG Luns noted at this point that everyone in the room was concerned precisely about this point.

Secretary Schlesinger answered that there was no political advantage in the Nunn Amendment nor was it so designed. It is in no way tied to Geneva but concerns only our own military posture, a point that could also be made about the manpower aspect of the Nunn Amendment. However, the Defense Department could classify the report and could present it in any degree of detail it felt appropriate. Conceivably the report to the Congress could even be held in abeyance for a while. Obviously, the effort could backfire on MBFR but it was not a necessary consequence of the Nunn initiative. In particular, it is worth reemphasizing that there is no requirement in the Nunn Amendment for reductions of warheads in the NATO guidelines area.

Secretary Schlesinger went on to note that the nuclear issue was being hotly debated in the United States, citing the recent Brookings study that suggested a reduction of 2,000 warheads, although on what basis was unclear. On the Soviet side it appeared that they had a capacity to deploy roughly 3,500 weapons. This might conceptually provide a floor for the U.S., but he did not expect us to go that low. It was worth remembering, however, that in the 1950's when the U.S. was pushing its doctrine of massive retaliation, we had about 3,500 weapons deployed. The number rose to 7,000 when the "nuclear firebreak" concept was developed by Secretary McNamara in the 1960's.

Minister Leber (FRG) repeated that there was no divergence of view on the requirement and utility for the study called for by the Nunn Amendment. He was relieved that the U.S. had a variety of options open to it in presenting the Congressional report, and hoped that as a consequence we should not be faced with a Congressional requirement for reductions.

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Secretary Schlesinger replied that while Congress was not entirely predictable, he felt that in this area we could count on Congressional cooperation, particularly since this was a substantive issue, not an emotional one like the Mansfield troop reduction amendment.

AGENDA ITEM III - SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS

Secretary General Luns then moved to Item III and asked General Goopaster and Admiral Hill-Norton whether they would be prepared to circulate the papers on Item III given the time factor. This they agreed to do.

AGENDA ITEM IV - FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME

SYG Luns then turned to Item IV, noting that the NPG should decide on the next ministerial meeting. He said that if no one else offered to host the meeting, the Italians would be prepared to do so. He then turned to Secretary Schlesinger and asked if the problem could be put on the broad shoulders of the United States. At this point Minister Mason suggested that San Francisco would be a nice place to hold the meeting. Schlesinger then replied that the U.S. would be prepared to hold the meeting, at a site to be determined.

AGENDA ITEM V - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

On Item V, SYG Luns suggested that the agreed minute be settled after the meeting and that the Group should now turn to the communique. If the members approved the communique, it would be released shortly after adjournment. The draft communique was adopted without change and the meeting was adjourned.

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NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM 10 DECEMBER 1974

LIST OF DELEGATES

NATO

His Excellency Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns  
Mr. M. C. Lissfelt

Miss E. Borgman Brouwer

Mr. D. C. Humphreys

Mr. Richard E. Shearer  
Miss W. Van Noort

Miss A. Hyde  
Mr. J. P. Mentzel  
Mr. R. M. Serio  
Mr. Eddie G. Luff  
Miss G. Hitchen  
Mr. M. G. Wilson  
Mr. A. De Varies  
Mr. R. Georgi  
Mr. D. Bittner  
Mr. E. Metcalfe  
Mr. G. Middleton  
Miss D. Dixon

Secretary General  
Deputy Director of Private  
Office  
Private Assistant to Secretary  
General  
Assistant Secretary General,  
Defense Planning and Policy  
Director of Nuclear Planning  
Secretary to Assistant Secre-  
tary General  
Secretary to Mr. Shearer  
Nuclear Planning Staff Officer  
Nuclear Planning Staff Officer  
Deputy Executive Secretary  
Secretary to Mr. Luff  
Secretary to NPG Staff Group  
Head, NATO Press Service  
Office of Security  
COSMIC Control  
Interpreter  
Interpreter  
Interpreter

USMISSION TO NATO

Ambassador David K. Bruce  
Mr. Eugene V. McAuliffe  
Dr. Laurence Legere  
Mr. John A. Woodworth  
Mr. Robert D. Collins  
Col. Richard Lambert, USA

Mrs. Mary Amaro

Permanent Representative  
Deputy Chief of Mission  
Defense Advisor  
Defense Plans Division  
Office of Political Advisor  
Deputy Director, Admin. Pers.  
and Security  
Secretary to Defense Advisor

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BELGIUM

Honorable Paul Vanden Boeynants  
Ambassador A. De Staercke

Lieutenant General A. Crekillie  
Mr. M. Vandekerckhove

Mr. A. Willot

Colonel Bem L. Dubuisson  
Colonel Avt Bem Lefebvre

Madame A. Van Gysegem

Minister of National Defense  
Permanent Representative to  
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Chief of Staff  
Minister Plenipotentiaire,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Counsellor, Belgian Delegation  
to NATO

Plans and Policy  
Chief of Cabinet, Aide to  
Minister of National Defense  
Secretary to Permanent Repre-  
sentative

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DENMARK

Honorable Erling Brondom  
Ambassador Anker Savart

General Otto Blixenkroner-Moller  
Mr. C. C. F. Langseth

Mr. J. Wahl

Mr. B. Rosenthal

Miss Else K. Sorensen

Major I. Bjorke

Minister of Defense  
Permanent Representative to  
NATO

Chief of Defense  
Permanent Under-Secretary of  
State, Ministry of Defense  
Head of Division, Ministry  
of Defense

Counsellor of Embassy, Danish  
Delegation to NATO

Private Secretary to the  
Minister of Defense  
Danish Delegation to NATO,  
Security Officer

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Honorable Georg Leber  
Mr. F. Krapf  
Admiral A. Zimmermann  
Rear Admiral H. Trebesch

Col. W. Altenburg

Dr. F. Pfeffer

Vice Admiral R. Steinhaus  
Mr. A. Halle  
Col. G. Brugmann

LTC P. H. Carstens

Dr. W. Stutzle

Col. R. Thyes

Dr. R. Huber

LTC H. P. Heck

Major K. Wiesmann

Mr. C. Anthor  
Mr. E. Dudka  
Mr. K. Freudenstein  
Mrs. A. Thelen

Mrs. E. Michel

Mrs. I. Tietz  
Capt. H. Kujat  
Mr. B. Arensmeier

Mr. A. Weiland  
MSgt. L. Hartung

MSgt. R. Wenz

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Ambassador to NATO  
Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces  
Acting Chief of Staff, Politico-  
Military Affairs, Operations  
Chief, Politico-Military Policies  
Branch  
Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs  
Chief, Planning Office  
Chief, Press and Information Office  
Personal Staff Officer to Chief of  
Staff, Federal Armed Forces  
Personal Staff Officer to Federal  
Minister of Defense  
Personal Advisor to Federal Minister  
of Defense  
Staff Officer, German Delegation to  
NATO  
First Secretary, German Delegation to  
NATO  
Staff Officer, Politico-Military  
Policies Branch  
Staff Officer, Politico-Military  
Policies Branch  
Interpreter  
Interpreter  
Interpreter  
Secretary to Federal Minister of  
Defense  
Secretary of Chief of Staff, Federal  
Armed Forces  
Secretary  
ADC to Federal Minister of Defense  
Security Assistant to Chief of Staff,  
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COSMIC Registrar and Security Officer  
Staff Sergeant, Politico-Military  
Policies Branch  
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Lt. General I. Vazeos

Brig. General S. Politis

Colonel K. Vouloutiadis

Lt. Colonel K. Dimitroulopoulos

Ambassador to NATO (representing  
Minister of Defense)

Deputy Chief, Hellenic Armed Forces  
Command

Director, Third Joint Staff Group  
of SHAFC

Staff Officer, SHAFC

Delegation to NATO, Security Officer

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ITALY

The Honorable Arnaldo Forlani	Minister of Defense
His Excellency Ambassador Felice Catalano di Mellini	Permanent Representative to NATO
Admiral Eugenio Henke	Chief of Defence General Staff
Major General Aldo Giambartolomei	Chief Cabinet, Ministry of Defence
Dr. Salvatore Chieffi	Vice Chief Cabinet, Ministry of Defence
Minister Eric Da Rin	Head NATO Section, Ministry of Defence
Minister Francesco Spinelli	Italian Delegation to NATO
Colonel Rinaldo Rinaldi	Chief of Public Information Cabinet
Colonel Giuseppe Capaldi	Chief Military Policy Division, Cabinet
Brigadier General Fernando Butelli	Chief 3d Div, Defense General Staff
Colonel Riccardo Bisogniero	Chief Military Policy Division, Defence General Staff
Colonel Mariano Antoci	Aide de Camp to Minister of Defence
Captain Gabriele de Schoenfeld	Chief Special Weapons Section, Defence General Staff
Colonel Gastore Azzari	Advisor to Permanent Represen- tative to NATO
Colonel Alberto Rossi	Interpreter
Lieutenant Colonel Giuseppe Peroncini	Interpreter
Lieutenant Colonel P. P. Bergami	Security Officer
Commander Leonardo Panebianco	Aide de Camp to Chief Defence General Staff
Captain Natale Proto	Special Weapons Section, Defence General Staff
Captain Alfonso Diana	Aide de Camp to Chief Defence General Staff
Mr. Giovanni Ferraro	Security Officer
Warrant Officer C. C. Severino Laudati	Security Officer
Warrant Officer Antonio Vittoria	Administrative Assistant
MP Corporal Emilio Libbi	Security Officer

PORTUGAL

Admiral J. B. Pinheiro de Azevedo

Ambassador J. De Freitas-Cruz

Mr. M. J. Branco E. Meira

LTC M. J. Madureira Pires

Member of the Junta of  
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Permanent Representative to  
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Portuguese Delegation to NATO,  
Security Officer  
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UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Honorable Roy Mason  
Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver  
His Excellency Sir Edward Peck

Mr. A. P. Hockaday

Colonel The Lord Alvingham  
Group Captain R. Ashford  
Dr. Ian Shaw

Mr. J. O. Kerr

Mr. C. Groves

Mr. W. F. Mumford

Mr. N. J. Beaumont

Mr. J. M. Legge

Mr. M. G. Dunmore

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Secretary of State for Defence  
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UNITED STATES

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger  
The Honorable Robert Ellsworth

Mr. Eugene V. McAuliffe

Mr. William Beecher

General George S. Brown  
Dr. Laurence Legere  
Mr. Harry E. Bergold, Jr.

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Major General John Wickham

Mr. Joseph Zaice

Colonel Jack Callaway

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Sheridan  
Captain Charles O. Prindle  
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Mr. John Graham

Secretary of Defense  
Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
ISA

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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Defense Advisor, US NATO

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Ambassador E. C. Swank (US)  
Captain W. E. Ohlrich, Jr. (USN)  
Captain J. W. Orrill (USN)  
Captain H. E. Padgett (USN)  
Commander D. W. Ashby (UKN)  
Lt. Cdr. L. J. Pascoal (PON)  
RMCM T. C. Kretz (USN)  
SD3 D. B. Francisco (USN)

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Director, Politico-Military Affairs  
Deputy Director, Naval Warfare  
Staff of SACLANTREPEUR  
Public Affairs Officer  
Nuclear Warfare Officer (Air)  
Aide de Camp  
Communicator  
Orderly for SACLANT

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SHAPE

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (USA)	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
General Sir John Mogg (UK Army)	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Captain R. J. Carlin (USN)	Assistant Executive to SACEUR
Group Captain R. Dick (UK Air Force)	Principal Staff Officer to SACEUR
Colonel T. A. Julian (USAF)	Staff Officer, Plans and Policy
Group Captain L. E. H. Scotchmer (UK Air Force)	Staff Officer, Operations
Commander Rex Turpin (UK Navy)	Staff Officer, Plans and Policy
LTC D. L. Groetken (USA)	Staff Officer, Plans and Policy
Major A. W. Kremer, Jr. (USA)	ADC to SACEUR
Captain C. J. L. Puxley (UK Army)	ADC to DSACEUR
Major A. S. Heizer (USA)	Security/Admin Officer
APP M. J. Spadari (Italian Army)	Asst. Security NCO and Asst. Admin NCO
Miss Jane Simpson	Secretary/stenographer