

11 July 1975

Col. [unclear]

Re: [unclear] Compendium

Per our discussion July 11, the Nuclear Compendium is attached for a final encounter prior to issuance. In addition to any comments you may offer, I will need an updated version of the appendix, Deployment and Movement data. Any other information that you consider should be added to the compendium or its annexes would of course be welcome.

Also per our discussion, I would appreciate a substantive paragraph on current decisions in progress for inclusion in the distribution memo. We would like to effect distribution as soon as statistical data on FY 75 is provided by DIA.

*Sydney Goldsmith*  
Sydney Goldsmith  
Assistant  
OASD(ISA)FMRA  
x54888

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Attachment - a/s

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(Attn: Sydney Goldsmith)

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Description of Material being Transferred (Do Not Enter Classified Information) AE Unclass forwarding memo 2 Jul 75, re: Nuclear Compendium... w/Incls(1)OASD(ISA)FMRA Memo 11 Jul 75, same subj. (2)ICS Memo 16 Aug 74 (DJSM-1196-74), same subj. // // // // // LAST ITEM // // //				
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OVERSEAS  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
ARRANGEMENTS

*line up*  
*is /*

A Revised Compendium of Agreements, Arrangements  
and Practices Concerning the Deployment,  
Storage and Transit of United States  
Nuclear Weapons Abroad

*Third edition*  
~~July~~ 1973  
*August*

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## NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

### PREFACE

#### Purpose

~~(S)~~ This compendium has been prepared by the Departments of State and Defense to serve as a basic reference document for senior government officials. It is intended to provide a concise summary of pertinent information regarding nuclear weapons arrangements. Due to the sensitivity of much of the information contained herein, distribution of the document will be strictly controlled. No reproduction, either in whole or in part, is authorized, and users are requested to handle it on a strict "need to know" basis.

#### Scope

~~(S)~~ The compendium summarizes the legal and operational aspects of US relations with other governments regarding the deployment (including storage) and transit of nuclear weapons by the US. It includes pertinent provisions of agreements, understandings and arrangements, as well as significant details on deployment and movement procedures.

~~(S)~~ In addition to the general and country narrative sections, a bibliography of principal documents is included. The listing contains citations and repositories for material referenced in the narrative sections, together with various other items which could, in given instances, supply necessary historical background.

~~(S)~~ Fiscal year data on deployments, aerial movements, overflights, overland movements between storage sites, and port visits is collected in a single appendix, rather than being included in the country sections as in previous versions of the compendium. An update of this data will be furnished each holder of the compendium annually.

~~(S)~~ Countries where US nuclear weapons arrangements no longer apply are so designated in the Table of Contents and at the heading of each chapter.

~~(S)~~ This is a revision of the second compendium, issued in October 1970. Responsibility for updating and revision rests with the Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

GENERAL

(U) Deployment and Storage

(S) An annual FY basic authorization by the President for nuclear weapons deployments outside the United States establishes a ceiling on the total number of weapons to be deployed (1) outside the United States, (2) in each country (3) by broad types of weapons within regions (i.e. Pacific, European, Atlantic) and (4) in NATO Europe. In the event of unforeseen crises, deployment may exceed the authorized ceiling by no more than 10 per cent in each separate country or region. Additional deployments are authorized for specified contingencies and conditions. The actual deployments against these ceilings, however, are controlled by the Secretary of Defense. Each fall, the overseas deployment of nuclear weapons is reviewed by the Unified and Specified Commands, JCS and Secretary of Defense, and a new Nuclear Weapon Deployment Authorization Plan is prepared. This is then forwarded, reflecting the comments of the Department of State and the ERDA to the President, who authorizes the ceilings for the end of the next fiscal year.

(S) Arrangements whereby the US stores nuclear weapons in foreign territory are of two distinct kinds. The US has entered into express agreements for nuclear weapons storage with some host countries (e.g., in NATO countries). These agreements, entered into in accordance with procedures established in the Atomic Energy Act, provide an explicit and unambiguous legal basis for continuing storage of nuclear weapons by the US in the host country. Nuclear weapons are also stored in

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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(S) The single most significant difference between the two kinds of arrangements described above is that the former -- explicit nuclear weapons storage agreements -- are mutually agreed to, while the latter -- the

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

Accordingly, the

explicit agreements afford a more reliable indicator of the future willingness of host countries to consent to the storage of US nuclear weapons in their territory.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

\*Because of Atomic Energy Act and policy restrictions, the US deliberately avoided adverting directly or indirectly to the possible introduction of nuclear weapons during the negotiation or implementation of these agreements, [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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(TS) Prior to December 1967, the flow of information to NATO member governments E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6) on the transit and deployment of US nuclear weapons was irregular and incomplete. Since that time, as a result of discussions in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and under the authority of the 1964 NATO-wide Agreement for Cooperation, NATO governments having nuclear weapons in their territory or having nuclear delivery units in their NATO-committed forces are advised of the types, numbers, yields and locations of all nuclear weapons which have been stored in their respective countries, and of those nuclear weapons stored elsewhere for the support of their forces. The US is committed to updating this information annually and informing them promptly of any significant changes in the stockpile.

(TS) Within those NATO countries in which nuclear weapons are stored in support of allied forces, local national forces provide ground transportation resources and additional security support for the movement of these weapons. Custody of US nuclear weapons, however, is at all times maintained by US personnel.

(U) Public Policy

(TS) US policy is publicly neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard particular aircraft or ships, or their storage in particular locations. This policy is strictly adhered to. Public statements by US officials confirming the presence of nuclear weapons abroad were made by Secretary McNamara, who said in 1966 that there were more than 7,000 US nuclear weapons in Europe; by Secretary Clifford, who said that in 1968 there were 7,200; and by Secretary Schlesinger, who in April 1975 reconfirmed the presence of over 7,000 warheads in Europe.

(TS) The policy does not preclude private confirmations or denials to governments regarding nuclear weapons storage or nuclear weapons aboard aircraft E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6) Private confirmations to governments of the specific location of nuclear weapons on their territory are confined by the Atomic Energy Act to nations with which the US has military agreements for cooperation under the Act.

(U) Overflights

(TS) E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5) The right to transport weapons by air for logistical purposes to, from and within countries where nuclear weapons are located by agreement or with the knowledge of the host government has not been questioned.

(TS) E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

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[Redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

The acceptance by foreign countries of overflights by United States military aircraft, in light of the well publicized US public policy neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard such aircraft, provides a legal justification for nuclear overflights that have been carried out pursuant to established military aircraft clearance procedures.

[Redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

No overflights of foreign countries are conducted for training purposes. The overflights referred to in this compendium are solely for logistic, administrative and maintenance purposes.

(U) Port Visits

~~(TS)~~ No country has expressly authorized visits of naval ships with nuclear weapons aboard.

[Redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

[Redacted]

In all other cases, the US has relied either on the base rights agreements or similar agreements, where these exist, or on normal diplomatic clearances for naval visits. It is also international practice that armaments aboard naval vessels exercising rights of innocent passage and naval vessels visiting foreign ports with permission of the host country are not subject to special inquiry or rules by the host country. In several instances, however, host countries have attempted to ascertain whether nuclear weapons were carried by US ships for which diplomatic clearances were requested.

~~(TS)~~ To date, the US has uniformly resisted such efforts, with the possible near exception of [Redacted]. In a number of cases (e.g., [Redacted]), tentative attempts to ascertain whether nuclear weapons are aboard specific ships and to make such ships subject to special rules were abandoned, presumably after the undesirability of setting this type of precedent became apparent to the governments concerned. In other cases [Redacted] the question has never been raised. When a host country has persisted, we have continued to adhere to this policy and our normal recourse has been to cancel the visit. The US is in a relatively strong position with respect to future visits to those countries which have in the past granted diplomatic clearance to US ships following a US refusal

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)

\*As guidance to US operational commanders for overflights by US aircraft with nuclear weapons on board, the Air Force Special Weapons Overflight Guide describes US practice regarding notification to foreign governments.

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to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons. The US position is further strengthened by the enactment of PL 93-513, a joint resolution of Congress assuring compensation for damages caused by nuclear incidents involving the nuclear reactor of a US warship. It should be noted that the Appendix includes data on all nuclear weapon overflights and port visits to any country or entity, and is not limited to nations appearing in the Country Sections.

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

~~(18)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored and no overflights with nuclear weapons are made

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ Deployment of nuclear weapons [Redacted] is authorized for support of [Redacted]. There are no weapons deployed [Redacted] for support of any other forces.

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~

[Redacted]

~~(TS)~~

[Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage

~~(TS)~~ Deployment of nuclear weapons [redacted] is authorized for support  
of [redacted]

(U) Tactical Strike Aircraft

~~(TS)~~ US theater aircraft can perform training and indoctrination flights  
or practice airborne alerts with nuclear weapons aboard only if the specific  
approval of the JCS is obtained, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is  
informed in advance of the operation. Current policy is that such flights  
will not be approved. [redacted]

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ A 1957 letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense from the Deputy Under Secretary of State stated that under the [Redacted]

Procedures have been adopted in this regard as outlined in the Special Weapons Overflight Guide.

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There are presently no overflights [Redacted] by US aircraft carrying nuclear weapons on board.

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

~~(S)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: No nuclear weapons are presently stored in



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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

There are no flights with nuclear weapons on board being conducted at this time,

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] It provides that [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ In a 1963 exchange of notes, the US agreed to maintain [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

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~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ In addition to the [Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted] Aircraft: [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: [Redacted]

(U) Overland Movements of Nuclear Weapons: There are no overland movements of nuclear weapons between US storage sites [Redacted]

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
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS




(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ It has




during port visits.


(U) Legal Aspects



~~(TS)~~ With regard to visits to



~~(TS)~~ Although no statement was made,



The US

position has not changed,

Logistic Aspects

(U) Port Visits: See Appendix.

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~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There is no present storage or air movement of nuclear weapons in or over [Redacted]

~~(S/FRD)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: [Redacted]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(Inactive)

(U) Summary

(TS) No nuclear weapons are stored [Redacted] and no overflights with nuclear weapons are made over [Redacted] Port visits [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

(TS) In conjunction with the conclusion of the [Redacted] the US Ambassador confirmed in writing [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(TS) US naval vessels [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Port Visits: See Appendix.

(TS) Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There is no present storage [Redacted] or air movement of nuclear weapons in or over [Redacted]  
[Redacted].

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[Redacted]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

GERMANY, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ Deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany is authorized for support of [redacted] US forces. Nuclear weapons are stored in Germany under authority of a 1959 government level agreement. In 1967, the US furnished the German Minister of Defense information on the types, numbers, yields and locations of the nuclear weapons stored in Germany and we are committed to doing so annually.

(U) The 1963 Supplementary Agreement to the NATO SOFA provides the aircraft, ships and vehicles of the parties to the Agreement access to Federal territory, territorial waters and airspace without referring to any restrictions growing out of nuclear propulsion or the presence of weapons.

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ The 1963 Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement specifically provides the right of access to and movement in and over Federal territory to the aircraft, ships and vehicles of the parties to the Agreement. Storage of nuclear weapons is authorized by the government-to-government agreement of 1959.

[redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Prior to 1967 the flow of information [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(i) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: The US has authorized deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany for support of [redacted] US forces.


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~~(TS)~~ Tactical Strike Aircraft: US theater aircraft can perform training and indoctrination flights or practice airborne alerts with nuclear weapons aboard only if the specific approval of the JCS is obtained, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is informed in advance of the operation. Current policy is that such flights will not be approved.



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
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS




(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ The US has




(U) Legal Aspects


~~(TS)~~ The Agreement on Military Facilities




~~(TS)~~ [redacted] provides for




It was implemented by Army and Air Force service-to-service agreements in 1960 which set forth the detailed arrangements



~~(TS)~~ Prior to 1967,



~~(TS)~~ The announcement of



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[REDACTED]

pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. The Act requires that recipient countries be "participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security."

[REDACTED]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: [REDACTED]

~~(TS)~~ Tactical Strike Aircraft: There are no US tactical strike squadrons [REDACTED] In any case, US theater aircraft can perform training and indoctrination flights or practice airborne alerts with nuclear weapons aboard only if the specific approval of the JCS is obtained and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is informed in advance of the operation.

[REDACTED]

Current policy is that such flights will not be approved.

~~(TS)~~ Negotiating Status: [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Factors which will bear on the final outcome of the negotiations include [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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~~(S)~~ Our objectives



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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

[Redacted]

(inactive)

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored [Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There is no present storage or air movement of nuclear weapons in or over [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: [Redacted]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[redacted]

(inactive)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

~~(S)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored in [redacted] and there are no overflights by US aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard.

~~(S)~~ While the [redacted] has always harbored some sensitivity concerning naval ship visits to its ports, until [redacted] such calls by US vessels were approved on a more or less routine basis.

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ Since [redacted]

Should this become [redacted] standard procedure, the US might wish to consider a visit, provided we do not in effect accept a limitation of such visits to ships which obviously do not have nuclear weapons on board.

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(inactive)

(S) No nuclear weapons are stored in and no overflights with nuclear weapons are made over [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) In attempting to find some formula which might be acceptable to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) In [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ Deployment of nuclear weapons [Redacted] is authorized for support of

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Prior to 1967, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: [Redacted] weapons [Redacted] for support of [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Tactical Strike Aircraft: US theater aircraft can perform training and indoctrination flights or practice airborne alerts with nuclear weapons aboard only if the specific approval of the JCS is obtained, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is informed in advance of the operation. Current policy is that such flights will not be approved. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

(TS) No nuclear weapons are stored in [Redacted] and there are no overflights by US aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

(TS) Under provisions of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Record of Discussion also provides in paragraph 2(c) that:

[Redacted]

(TS) The US has interpreted these [Redacted] as requiring prior consultation [Redacted]

In order to make certain there was no misunderstanding about our procedures, the Ambassador raised this matter with the Foreign Minister in 1963. The US record of this discussion established that there was common understanding

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

that the [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ We had assumed that [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Administration of [redacted] and all weapons have now been removed.

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There is no present storage or air movement of nuclear weapons in or over [redacted]

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

(S) ~~(TS)~~ Deployment of nuclear weapons [Redacted] is authorized for support of US forces. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Since 1958, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

(S) ~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: The US has authorized deployment of nuclear weapons [Redacted] for support of US forces.

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is made, it shall be  
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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[redacted]

(inactive)

(TS) Withdrawal of US Forces from [redacted] [redacted] at the request of the Government of [redacted] rendered US nuclear storage or overflight even less likely than in the past. No nuclear weapons were ever stored [redacted]

[redacted] The US informed [redacted] in 1960 that it had never stored nuclear weapons in [redacted] and had no plans to do so.

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[REDACTED]

(S) No nuclear weapons are stored in [REDACTED] and there are no overflights by US aircraft with nuclear weapons on board. Furthermore, we have no nuclear weapons arrangements or atomic energy agreements with [REDACTED]. As noted in the Special Weapons Overflight Guide, the Government of [REDACTED] makes no distinction in its flight regulations regarding nuclear weapons or components thereof.

[REDACTED]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(inactive)

(U) Summary

~~(S)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored in [Redacted] and there are no overflights by US aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.

[Redacted]

We have continued to request ship visits and the [Redacted] has granted clearance.

(U) Legal and Political Aspects

~~(S)~~ On [Redacted]

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

~~(S)~~ On [Redacted]

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

US continue to request clearances for naval vessels as in the past, and indicated such clearances would be granted.

(S) The Department of State instructed [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S) On October 2, [redacted]  
[redacted]

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~~and regulations under the Act~~

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(Also see the sections on [Redacted])

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ Deployment of nuclear weapons in [Redacted] is authorized for support of [Redacted]. There are no weapons deployed in [Redacted] for support of any other forces.

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ An exchange of notes of 1960 [Redacted]

Intra-theater redistribution of weapons is to be as determined by SAGEUR or SASLANT. All of these agreements provide for continuous US custody of the weapons.

~~(TS)~~ A separate government-to-government agreement of [Redacted] This agreement is implemented by the multinational technical arrangement of 1962.

~~(TS)~~ In 1966, the [Redacted] that there could be no unauthorized flights [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Prior to 1967, [Redacted]

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amended, and regulations under the Act

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

36

~~(TS)~~ In July 1969, [redacted] in response to a written  
question from [redacted]

[redacted] This was the first official  
statement on the matter.

~~(S)~~

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: The US has authorized deployment of nuclear  
weapons in [redacted] for support of [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Tactical Strike Aircraft: US theater aircraft can perform training  
and indoctrination flights or practice airborne alerts with nuclear  
weapons aboard only if the specific approval of the JCS is obtained; and  
the Deputy Secretary of Defense is informed in advance of the operation.  
Current policy is that such flights will not be approved. [redacted]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored in [REDACTED] and no storage is planned for the future. In addition, there have been no nuclear overflights or transits of [REDACTED] territory. In response to a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There is no present storage or air movement of nuclear weapons in or over [REDACTED] territory.

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored in [REDACTED] and none are planned for the future. There are no overflights of [REDACTED] aircraft with nuclear weapons on board. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ When the question of nuclear weapons storage (as distinguished from nuclear weapons transit) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


(U) The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America entered into force for [REDACTED] Protocol II to the Treaty was ratified by the United States on May 8, 1971. The United States has declared its intention to act consistent with the spirit of the Treaty with respect to [REDACTED].

(U) In ratifying Protocol II to the Treaty, the United States appended an understanding which reads in relevant part as follows:

"That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges."


Approved for Release by NSA  
on 08-22-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526


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~~(U) SECRET~~


(TS) Thus, 

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Ship Transits through Canal: See Appendix.

(TS) Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage: There are no overflights of  by aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.

(TS) Sea Movement of Nuclear Weapons: 

(TS) Nuclear Weapons Storage: There are no nuclear weapons stored in the 

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

(TS) Deployment of nuclear weapons in [Redacted] is authorized for support of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

(TS) [Redacted]

(TS) [Redacted]

(TS) The Department of State

[Redacted]

(TS) [Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.


[Redacted]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS




(U) Summary

(TS) No nuclear weapons are stored



(U) Legal Aspects


(TS) Articles



(TS) A 1958 letter from Assistant Secretary of State Elbrick, to Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague,



(TS) During preliminary Base Renewal discussions



(U) Logistic Aspects

(S) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix



(TS) Nuclear Weapons Storage: No nuclear weapons are stored



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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS



(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ [redacted]  
[redacted] There are no weapons deployed [redacted] for support of any other forces.

~~(TS)~~ [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ US aircraft

[redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

~~(TS)~~ Under terms of the

[redacted]

~~(TS)~~

[redacted]

~~(TS)~~ On June 20,

[redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Since the

[Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Strategic Air Command Aircraft: If SAC goes on fractional alert (i.e., if Selective Employment Air/Ground Alert (SEAGA) plans are activated),

[Redacted]

[Redacted]. These alert plans were implemented July 1, 1969.

~~(TS)~~ Air Movement of Nuclear Weapons for Overseas Storage:

[Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage:

[Redacted]

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(inactive)

~~(TS)~~ No nuclear weapons are stored in [Redacted] and there are no overflights by US aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.

~~(S)~~ In January 1964 the [Redacted] Government declared that no ships or aircraft might visit that country without prior assurances that they do not possess a nuclear weapons potential. (A government note of [Redacted] established procedures for clearance of the entry of foreign naval vessels and aircraft.) This policy was established by the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ In November 1966, we authorized the Embassy, in the presentation of written requests for visits by non-nuclear configured ships, to state orally, if necessary, that we "had taken into account the sensitivities of the [Redacted]"

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ Strict implementation of the [Redacted] was revived [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

[Redacted]

(U) Summary

~~(TS)~~ The US no longer deploys nuclear weapons [Redacted]

(U) Legal Aspects

(U) [Redacted]

~~(TS)~~ In a 1957 letter from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, it was stated that [Redacted]

[Redacted] In a later 1957 letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), it was stated [Redacted]

(U) Article II of the 1965 Status of Forces Agreement states in complement to the Mutual Defense Agreement [Redacted] that:

"The United States armed forces may conduct all activities and operations necessary for the accomplishment of their mission under the Mutual Defense Treaty [Redacted] and shall act in the closest collaboration with the appropriate [Redacted] authorities through channels mutually agreed upon."

~~(TS)~~ The United States regards [Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Little change in these agreements is likely to result from this review.

(TS) Prior to 1967, [Redacted]

(TS) At a press conference on February [Redacted]

(U) Logistic Aspects

(U) Deployment and Movement: See Appendix.

(TS) Nuclear Weapons Storage: [Redacted]

(TS) Tactical Strike Aircraft; US theater aircraft can perform training and indoctrination flights or practice airborne alerts with nuclear weapons aboard only if the specific approval of the JCS is obtained, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is informed in advance of the operation. Current policy is that such flights will not be approved, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS

UNITED KINGDOM

(See also section on Germany)

(U) Summary

(TS) Deployment of nuclear weapons in the UK is authorized for support of [redacted] US forces. Storage of nuclear weapons in the UK for the use of NATO forces is authorized by a 1961 government-level agreement. Agreements are in effect for overflight with nuclear weapons and set procedures are followed with [redacted] concerning aircraft carrying radioactive material. In 1967, the US furnished the Minister of Defense information on the types, numbers, yields and locations of the nuclear weapons stored in the UK, and we are committed to doing so annually.

(U) Legal Aspects

(TS) Nuclear weapons are stored in the United Kingdom for the use of [redacted] under authority of a 1961 government-to-government agreement. All weapons are to remain under continuous US custody. Storage is implemented by a 1961 Army service-to-service agreement, which provides for the movement of weapons by US forces to and from points of entry and exit in the UK. Ground transportation of the weapons, under continuous US custody, and security support is provided by [redacted]. There is a similar Navy service-to-service agreement of 1966, governing storage of nuclear ASW weapons [redacted]. Another Navy agreement of 1967 provides for movement of nuclear weapons [redacted].

(TS) With reference to overflight rights, a 1958 telegram [redacted] to the Secretary of State stated that the [redacted].

The US accepted this requirement, and agreed procedures were embodied in a [redacted].

(TS) The [redacted] Agreement provides for stationing of [redacted] and by necessary implication covers the [redacted] for which the agreement was negotiated. Visits of US Navy ships to other [redacted].

There can be no doubt that the Government of [redacted].

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~~(TS)~~ The US is currently in the process of negotiating [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ Prior to 1967, the flow of information [redacted]

[redacted] In December 1967, the US provided the Minister of Defense information on the types, numbers, yields and locations of the nuclear weapons stored in the UK, and this information will be updated annually or when significant changes occur.

(U) Logistic Aspects

~~(TS)~~ Nuclear Weapons Storage: The US has authorized deployment of nuclear weapons in the UK for support of [redacted] US forces.

~~(TS)~~ Tactical Strike Aircraft: US theater aircraft can perform training and indoctrination flights on practice airborne alerts with nuclear weapons aboard only if the specific approval of the JCS is obtained, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is informed in advance of the operation. Current policy is that such flights will not be approved. [redacted]

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

[Redacted]

1. July 12, 1957

"The [Redacted] for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information and Mutual Defense Purposes." [Redacted] Filed: State-L/T.

2. May 9, 1963

"Status of Forces Agreement." [Redacted] Filed: State-L/T.

[Redacted]

1. January 22, 1960

Government level agreement [Redacted] ~~Secret.~~ Filed: State-L/T.

2. April 7, 1960

Agreement Between the Designated Military Representatives of the United States Army and of the [Redacted] ~~Secret.~~ Filed: OATS (AE).

3. June 30, 1960

Government level agreement supplementing January 22, 1960 agreement. ~~Secret.~~ Filed: State-L/T.

4. October 4, 1960

"Technical Arrangement between the Commander-in-Chief of United States Air Force in Europe and [Redacted] and Associated Installations." ~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

5. October 20, 1967

Circular Letter, No. 3/46 from the [Redacted] to the North Atlantic Council. Unclassified. Filed: State-EUR/RPM and EUR/FBX.

6. See Multilateral Documents

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

1. March 27, 1941

"Agreement and Exchange of Notes between the United States and [redacted] concerning the defense of [redacted] Leased Naval and Air Bases." EAS 235. Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

2. August 23, 1957

Letter to Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield Sprague from Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy. ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State/OPR/RS/R; OSD-ISA/FMRA.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

3. May 22, 1958

Letter from [redacted] to General Curtis LeMay, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

4. November 17, 1966

Memorandum to the Secretary of State from John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-EUR/BMI/UK.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

1. April 17, 1952

Schedule B of the Order-in-Council of April 17, 1952. Filed: OSD-OGC(IA).

2. June 8, 1960

Revision of Schedule B of the Order-in-Council of April 17, 1952. Not available in Departments of State or Defense.

3. August 16, 1963

Government level agreement concerning the provisions of [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

4. September 28 & 30, 1963

Government level agreement concerning [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

5. October 18, 1963

"Service-to-Service Agreement between the United States Air Force and the [redacted] on a Supplementary arrangement for the [redacted]"

~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

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6. October 18, 1963

"Service-to-Service Agreement between the United States Air Force and the

[Redacted]

~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

7. May 15, 1964

"Service-to-Service Arrangement between the United States Air Force and the [Redacted] to Supplement and Provide for the Implementation of the Government-to-Government Agreement of 28 and 30 September, 1963 concerning

[Redacted]

~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

8. September 17, 1965

Consultative Agreement supplementing the agreements of August 16, 1963 and September 28 and 30, 1963. ~~Secret.~~ Filed: State-L/T.

9. July 27, 1967

Government level agreement concerning the

[Redacted]

~~Secret.~~ Filed: State-L/T.

10. December 18, 1967

"Service-to-Service Arrangement between the United States Navy and the [Redacted] to Supplement and Provide for Implementation of the Government-to-Government Agreement of 27 July 1967 concerning United States [Redacted]

[Redacted] at the Base." ~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

11. March 7, 1968

"Memorandum of Conversation Concerning the Visit of US Warships [Redacted]

[Redacted] ~~Confidential.~~ Filed: State-L/EUR and OPR/RS/R. Current overflight agreement.

12. See Multilateral Documents

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1. January 24, 1964  
[redacted] telegram to State, [redacted] concerning the position of the [redacted] Government on port entry and overflight of vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-NEA/INC.
  2. November 3, 1966  
[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted] "Subject: Naval Ship Visits to [redacted] ~~Confidential~~ Filed: State-NEA/INC.
  3. November 4, 1966  
Joint State-Defense Message to [redacted] [redacted] "Subject: Naval Ship Visits to [redacted] ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-NEA/INC.
  4. July 4, 1968\*  
Joint State-Defense Message to [redacted] [redacted] concerning request for [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.
  5. February 15, 1969\*  
Joint State-Defense Message to [redacted] [redacted] concerning request for [redacted] ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-NEA/INC.
  6. May 19, 1969\*  
Ministry of Defense and External Affairs Circular No. PR/DC/8 (Protocol 8/69). Unclassified. Filed: State-NEA/INC.
- 
1. April 27, 1951  
"The [redacted] Agreement Concerning the Defense of [redacted] Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.
  2. May 3, 1967  
State telegram to [redacted] "Subject: Nuclear Weapons on Visiting Ships." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-EUR/SCAN and OPR/RS/R.
  3. February 26, 1968  
Note No. 93 USA 8, in which [redacted] Government requests discussions to supplement the Agreement of April 27, 1951. ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-PM/AE and OPR/RS/R.
  4. May 18, 1968  
State telegram to [redacted] "Subject: [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-EUR/SCAN.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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54

5. May 31, 1968\*

Government level agreement concerning

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed:

State-L/T.

6. June 21, 1969\*

[redacted] telegram to State, [redacted]

"Subject: Public Response to Questions About Nuclear Weapons on US Ships."

~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

7. June 21, 1969\*

State Telegram to [redacted]

"Subject: Public Response to Questions About Nuclear Weapons on US Ships."

~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

[redacted]  
1. March 27, 1959

Government level agreement which authorizes the stockpile of nuclear weapons in support of NATO forces.

~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

2. April 7, 1960

"Arrangement between Headquarters United States Army Europe and the Minister of Defense of the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed:

OSD-OGC-(IA).

3. April 10, 1960

"Technical Arrangement between the Commander-in-Chief United States Air Forces in Europe and the [redacted]

[redacted]

Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA). ~~Secret~~

4. August 3, 1959

"Status of Forces in the [redacted]

[redacted] Signed August 3, 1959. [redacted] ~~Unclassified~~. Filed:

State-L/T.

5. See Multilateral Documents

[redacted]  
1. October 12, 1953

[redacted] Agreement Concerning Military Facilities in [redacted]

[redacted] ~~Unclassified~~. Filed: State-L/T.

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2. December 30, 1959

Government level agreement concerning the [redacted] [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

3. May 3, 1960

"Technical Arrangements between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Force in Europe and the Chief of Staff of [redacted]

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

4. June 17, 1960

"Arrangement between the Designated Military Representatives of the United States Army in Europe and the Chief of [redacted]

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

5. August 28, 1961\*

Amendment to the Technical Agreement for [redacted] (May 3, 1960). ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

6. See Multilateral Documents

[redacted]  
1. December 27, 1967\*

[redacted] airgram to State, [redacted] "Subject: Visits of US Naval Vessels to [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

2. May 7, 1968\*

State telegram to [redacted] Subject: "US Ship Visits to [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

3. September 25, 1968\*

State Telegram to [redacted] Subject: "US Ship Visits to [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

4. September 27, 1968\*

[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted]. "Subject: Ship Visit to [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

5. October 17, 1968\*

[redacted] Airgram to State, [redacted] "Subject: Ship Visits to [redacted] ~~Secret~~. State-PM/AE.

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6. February 26, 1969\*

State Airgram to [redacted] "Subject: US Naval Ship Visits to [redacted] ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

[redacted]

1. October 20, 1954

"Agreement between the United States of America and [redacted] Regarding Bilateral Infrastructure in Implementation of Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

2. January 13, 1962

Government level agreement regarding [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

3. April 1, 1963

"Arrangement Between the Designated Representatives of the United States Forces and the [redacted]

~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA) and ISA/FMRA.

4. See Multilateral Documents

[redacted]

1. January 6, 1960

"Record of Discussion of Confidential Talks" recorded in [redacted] Security Treaty Administrative Agreements and Accompanying Notes and Minutes and Comments." Referred to as the [redacted] [redacted] Section II, pp. 7-9, ~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD/ISA/FMRA.

2. January 19, 1960

"Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security." [redacted] Filed: State-L/T.

3. January 26, 1968

[redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-EA/J.

[redacted]

1. January 4, 1958

[redacted] message to Department of Army, [redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/ISO.

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downgrading and  
declassification~~

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

57

2. July 9, 1966

"The US [ ] Agreement concerning the Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in [ ] [ ] Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.

[ ]

1. September 9, 1954

"The [ ] Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance." Signed September 9, 1954; entered into force October 30, 1954. [ ] Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.

2. November 18, 1955

Letter from Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr., to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Reuben B. Robertson Jr., concerning placement of nuclear weapons in [ ] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: OSD-ISA/FMRA.

3. July 30, 1958

JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. "Subject: Introduction and Storage of Special Weapons in Overseas Areas." ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: OSD-ISA/FMRA.

4. June 18, 1960

State telegram to [ ] concerning presence of nuclear weapons in [ ] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-OPR/RS/R.

5. January 18, 1962

[ ] airgram to State, [ ] "Subject: Parliamentary Deputy Questions if [ ] [ ] Confidential. Filed: OSD-ISA/FMRA.

[ ]

1. April 7, 1969\*

US Government Memorandum from [ ] [ ] Confidential. Filed: State-PM/AE.

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2. May 3, 1969\*  
State telegram to [redacted]  
"Subject: Clearance Procedures for Aircraft Overflights and Ship Visits."  
~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.
  3. May 21, 1969\*  
[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted] "Subject: Ship Visits." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.
  4. June 5, 1969\*  
[redacted] Telegram to State [redacted] "Subject: Ship Visits." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.
  5. August 30, 1969\*  
State Telegram to [redacted] "Subject: Ship Visits & Aircraft Overflights Involving Nuclear Weapons." ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.
- [redacted]
1. January 26, 1960  
Exchange of notes concerning the stockpile of nuclear weapons. ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.
  2. May 18, 1960  
"Technical Arrangement between the Designated Military Representatives of the United States Army and of [redacted]  
[redacted]  
~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).
  3. March 11, 1961  
Government level agreement concerning the stockpile of nuclear weapons for third parties. ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.
  4. April 18, 1962  
"Technical Arrangements between Designated Military Representatives of the United States and [redacted]  
[redacted]  
~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).
  5. February 18, 1966  
[redacted] Airgram to State, [redacted]  
"Subject: Parliamentary Question Regarding Nuclear Weapons Aboard Aircraft [redacted]  
[redacted] ~~Unclassified~~.  
Filed: State-EUR/FBX and OPR/RS/R.

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6. February 13, 1968

[redacted] Airgram to State, [redacted]  
"Subject: Parliamentary Question Concerning Overflight of Nuclear Weapons."  
Unclassified. Filed: State-OPR/RS/R.

7. February 27, 1968

"Technical Arrangement Between the US Commander Eastern Atlantic of the United States Navy and the Chief of the Naval Staff of the [redacted] for the Nuclear Weapons Support of the [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Allocated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Secret. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

8. July 29, 1969\*

[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted]  
"Subject: Denial of CBW Weapons Storage." Limited Official Use. Filed: State-PM/AE.

9. See Multilateral Documents

[redacted]  
1. March 11, 1968\*

State Airgram to the [redacted]  
"Subject: Navy Request for Special Authorization to Use Foreign Airfields for Surveillance Operations." Secret. Filed: State-PM/AE.

2. May 16, 1969\*

[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted]  
"Subject: Foreign Airports for US Navy Surveillance Operations." Secret. Filed: State-PM/AE.

3. July 1, 1969\*

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(5)(6)

Memorandum for the Record drafted by J. T. Kendrick. "Subject: [redacted]  
[redacted] Secret. Filed: State-PM/AE.

4. July 16, 1969\*

State Telegram to The [redacted]  
"Subject: Use of [redacted] Airfields for USN Surveillance Operations." Secret. Filed: State-PM/AE.

[redacted]  
1. October 23, 1959

Air Pouch from [redacted] to State, Desp. No. [redacted]  
"Subject: Atomic Weapons and [redacted]" Secret. Filed: State-RS/R.

2. March 28, 1963\*

[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted] Subject: [redacted]  
Public Statement on Washington Visit." Secret. Filed: State: EUR/SCAN.

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3. August 4, 1966:

Letter from Scott George, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Director for Atomic Energy and Aerospace, to

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-EUR/SCAN.

1. October 13, 1965

[redacted] Telegram to State, [redacted] "Subject:

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE and OPR/RS/R; and OSD-ISA/FMRA.

2. See Multilateral Documents

1. March 14, 1947

"The US [redacted] Agreement concerning Military Bases in [redacted] Signed March 14, 1947, entered into force March 26, 1947. [redacted]. Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.

2. December 7, 1959

"The [redacted] Agreement Concerning the Relinquishment of [redacted] and Adjacent Areas." [redacted] Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.

3. January 28, 1966

[redacted] telegram to State [redacted] concerning statements of Foreign Affairs Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted] Unclassified. Filed: State-OPR/RS/R.

4. February 2, 1966

State Telegram to [redacted] concerning reply to inquiry about presence of

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: OSD-ISA/FMRA.

1. September 6, 1951

"The [redacted] Agreement Regarding the Use of the Facilities in [redacted] for Defense." [redacted] Unclassified. (Supplemented by exchange of notes, December 9, 1971. [redacted])

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2. November 15, 1957

Supplementary Technical Agreement to the Agreement of September 6, 1951. ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

3. March 31, 1958

Letter from Assistant Secretary, C. Burke Elbrick to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Mansfield D. Sprague. ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-OPR/RS/R; OSD-ISA/FMRA.

4. July 9, 1973

[redacted] telegram to State, [redacted] concerning statements by Prime Minister Caetano about "main importance to US of [redacted] [redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE, OSD-ISA/FMRA.

5. August 1, 1973

State telegram to [redacted] concerning [redacted] [redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE, OSD-ISA/FMRA.

[redacted]

1. September 26, 1953

"Technical Agreement Annex to the Defense Agreement." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

2. July 17, 1964

The [redacted] concerning the operation of nuclear powered warships at the [redacted] ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-L/T.

3. June 27, 1966

Memorandum from David Gordon, L/EUR. "Subject: Considerations Relating to a Possible Claim of Innocent Passage for Military Aircraft through Airspace over International Straits." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/EUR.

4. January 22, 1966

Message [redacted] from Chief JUSMAG-MAAG, [redacted] to USCINCEUR, reported JCS. ~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-ISA/FMRA

5. March 26, 1969\*

Revision to the Technical Annex of September 26, 1953. ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-L/T.

6. May 7, 1969\*

State Telegram to [redacted] "Subject: Storage of Nuclear Weapons." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE.

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~~Instructions~~  
~~Standard, 12/10/68~~

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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7. June 20, 1969\*

Exchange of notes providing for extension of the 1953 Defense Agreement. ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-EUR/SPP.

8. June 20, 1970

State Telegram to [redacted] ~~Secret~~-EXDIS, paragraph 16. Filed: State-EUR/SPP.

9. August 6, 1970

Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, [redacted] with related ~~Confidential~~ exchange of notes. Filed: State-L/EUR.

[redacted]  
1. December 2, 1954

"The [redacted] Mutual Defense Treaty." [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

2. February 20, 1957

Letter from Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Gerard C. Smith to Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray. ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: OSD-ISA/FMRA.

3. December 16, 1957

Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Mansfield D. Sprague. ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-OPR/RS/R and OSD-ISA/FMRA.

4. August 31, 1965

"The [redacted] Agreement Concerning the Status of US Armed Forces in the [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

[redacted]  
1. June 23, 1955

Government Level Agreement implementing the Status of Forces Agreement of the same date. ~~Confidential~~. Filed: State-L/T.

2. December 6, 1954

"The [redacted] Air Technical Arrangement." ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

3. November 20, 1958

"Terms of Agreement for the Establishment of a NATO [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

4. February 28, 1959

"Arrangement between the Designated Military Representatives of the US Army and of [redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

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In Compliance with Executive Order  
13526~~

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5. July 9, 1959

"Technical Arrangements Between Designated Military Representatives of the US and [redacted]"

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

6. March 17, 1962\*

"Addendum I to the Technical Arrangements Between Designated Representatives of the US and [redacted]"

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

7. July 3, 1969\*

"Agreement Between the Governments of the [redacted] and of the United States of America Relative to the Collective Measures to be Taken by the Two Governments Pursuant to Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty for the Development of their Collective Capacity to Resist Armed Attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Area." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

8. See Multilateral Documents

[redacted]  
1. July 24, 1958

[redacted] ~~Top Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE and OPR/RS/R.

2. September 19, 1958

[redacted] Agreement on Procedures for Notification and Crash Reporting on Flights with Hazardous Cargoes." ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-PM/AE and OSD-OGC-(IA).

3. August 3, 1961

Government level Agreement concerning the Support of NATO with US nuclear weapons. ~~Secret~~. Filed: State-L/T.

4. August 25, 1961

"Arrangement Between the Designated Military Representatives of the United States Army and of [redacted]"

[redacted] ~~Secret~~. Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

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downgrading and  
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5. February 20, 1964

[Redacted]  
~~Secret.~~ Filed: State-L/T.

6. June 9, 1966

"Arrangement Between the Designated Representatives of the United States Navy and the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

7. November 3, 1967

[Redacted]

~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

8. See Multilateral Documents

Multilateral Documents

1. July 19, 1962

"A Multinational Technical Arrangement Between the Designated Representatives of the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

United States of America concerning the Maintenance of NATO special Ammunition Storage Support of More than one User Nation." ~~Secret.~~ Filed: OSD-OGC-(IA).

2. February 14, 1967

"Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America." Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T. Not signed by the United States.

3. February 20, 1967\*

"Letter dated 20 February from the Permanent Representative [Redacted] to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General" containing "The Final Act of the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America." Unclassified. A/663. Filed: State-10-UN.

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Section 1.4(d) Atomic Energy Act of 1954~~

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4. December 2, 1967,  
February 4, 1969, and  
December 17, 1969  
Update

The United States

EUR/RPM.

~~Top Secret.~~ Filed: State-

5. February 20, 1967

"Protocol I and Protocol II of the  
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear  
Weapons in Latin America," and statement  
accompanying Signature for the United  
States. Unclassified. Filed: State-L/T.

\*Denotes Documents which are not referred to in the Compendium.

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Section 1.44D Atomic Energy Act of 1954~~



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


DJSM-1196-74  
16 August 1974

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Nuclear Weapons Compendium

1. Reference is made to your memorandum I-23264/72 Ct dated 6 May 1972, subject as above.
2. The attached enclosure provides requested deployment and movement data for FY 1974.
3. In the future this data will be provided directly by Director, Defense Nuclear Agency.
4. Without enclosure, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.



ADRIAN ST JOHN  
Major General, USA  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure  
a/s

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA  
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trative and criminal sanctions. Handle as  
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Section 146a - Atomic Energy Act of 1954.~~

~~Classified by Director, DNA~~

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TS CARD  
11 JUL 75

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I-35230/74  
14 JUL 75

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT SUMMARY  
FOR 1 JULY 1973 - 30 JUNE 1974 (U)

<u>Country</u>	<u>FY 1974<sup>3</sup> 1/ Deployment Authorization</u>	<u>2/30 Jun 74 On-Hand</u>	<u>Air Transport Into Out of</u>	<u>With- in</u>	<u>3/ Over Flight</u>	<u>4/ Land Convoy</u>	<u>Port Visits</u>
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Section 1.4(b) - Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  
Classified by Director, NSA~~

TS CARD  
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Enclosure 14 JUL 75

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Country	FY 197 <sup>75</sup> <del>74</del> 1/	2/	Air Transport		3/	4/	Port Visits
	Deployment Authorization	30Jun74 On-Hand	Into	With- Out of in	Over Flight	Land Convoy	

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BASED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/14/01 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP~~

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Country	FY 19 <del>74</del> <sup>76</sup> 1/	2/	Air Transport		3/	4/	Port
	Deployment Authorization	30 Jun <del>74</del>	Into	With-	Over	Land	
		On-Hand	Out of	in	Flight	Convoy	Visits

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NOTES:

1. Extracted from ~~SN 400-73~~, dated 6 September 1973, subject ~~7~~ FY 197~~4~~<sup>76</sup> Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization (U).
2. Extracted from DNA Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Report, dated 30 June 1974.

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AND SHOULD BE DECLASSIFIED  
AS APPLICABLE~~

NOTES (Cont'd):

3. Air transport into or out of a country involves an initial landing from another country and/or a final takeoff to another country with nuclear weapons on-board. Air transport within a country involves a takeoff, overflight and landing with nuclear weapons on-board, within the same country. The above types of air movements may or may not involve off-load or on-load of nuclear weapons. Overflights involve flights with nuclear weapons on-board, over a country without either landings or takeoffs.
  
4. Land Convoys consist of movements between storage locations both within a country and across national boundaries. Shipments across national boundaries were counted in all countries involved.

# ~~TOP SECRET~~ INFORMATION COVER SHEET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
~~TOP SECRET~~ INFORMATION COVER SHEET

CONTROL NUMBER(S)    INCLOSURES

*F 35198/5*

The attached ~~TOP SECRET~~ information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) identified by number above.

Each person receiving the attached ~~TOP SECRET~~ information shall sign and fill in the information required below.

#	NAME	DATE		REMARKS <small>(Indicate portions and all of documents read)</small>
		RECEIVED	RELEASED	
1	<i>Frank Meyer</i>	<i>7/9/78</i>		<i>Processed</i>
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