



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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2011-063, document no. 5
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: December 19, 2013



GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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- ANNEX H DIA Items Relating to Cuba
- ANNEX I Extracts from the Diplomatic Summary
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- ANNEX K NPIC Reports
- ANNEX L Review of NIE's and SNIE's
- ANNEX M Intelligence Justification for U-2 Mission
 on 14 October 1962

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ANNEX H

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ITEMS RELATING TO CUBA

This annex contains the Defense Intelligence Agency items relating to Cuba published in the DIA Intelligence Summary and the DIA Intelligence Bulletin during the period 14 April 1962 through 14 October 1962. It also contains DIA Intelligence Summary cable items and DIA Intelligence Bulletin cable items which were not published in hard copy form during that period.

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
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
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30 April 1962

Increased Counterrevolutionary Activity

Counterrevolutionary activity has apparently increased throughout Cuba. Five militia companies were reportedly moved to the Baracoa area on 16 April because of dissident activity there, and during the preceding week the commander of a militia battalion, several officers and an estimated 200 men were said to have defected after a fire fight with loyal forces in the Escambray Mountains. A defecting group is supposedly active in Pinar del Rio, while a Cuban Army captain and several hundred troops stationed in the Holguin-Gibara area reportedly went over to the counterrevolutionaries on 15 April.

Sabotage activities are also increasing. Intercepted Cuban messages have reported military action against a dissident group in the Santa Clara area, and other messages have indicated increased alert measures. Acts of sabotage against power plants and a powder magazine in Havana harbor are said to be planned for May Day. The press reports that a 28 April anti-Castro demonstration in Havana was quickly borken up by police action.

Comment: The strengths and locations of the various counterrevolutionary groups are not known, but the activity is apparently still on a small scale and not well co-ordinated. The Cuban Government is sensitive to the potential danger, however, and seems to be moving vigorously against it. The demonstration in Havana is the first reported since last September and may indicate a quickening of anti-Castro activity in the capital as well.

~~(SECRET)~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

9 July 1962

Anti-US Rally Before US Embassy in Dominican Republic

On 7 July, a Communist-inspired demonstration was conducted by a reported 2,500 youths in front of the US Embassy in Santo Domingo. The crowd angrily protested US "interference" in Dominican internal affairs. The Embassy, forewarned and on an alert status for this demonstration, has since resumed normal operations. The Dominican Council of State has issued statements charging the Cuban Government with responsibility for the disorder and urging all democratic elements to remain calm. (CONFIDENTIAL)

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 July 1962

Group of Soviet Trawlers on Way to Havana Area

A group of Soviet fishing trawlers including at least two OKEAN-Class, 502-GRT, refrigerated ships is currently en route the Havana area. A personal message from the crew members of one trawler implied that the ship would not return home until February. Such extended operations could represent search activities prior to placing a fishing fleet near Cuba. Similar activity preceded the establishment of the Georges Bank Fishing Fleet. This will be the initial appearance of Soviet trawlers in the Cuban area. (SECRET)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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11 July 1962

Soviet Preparations to Establish Civil Air Service
to Havana

Moscow has approached the UK for permission for an Aeroflot TU-114 heavy turboprop transport to carry out a survey flight to Havana via Conakry, Guinea. The flight may include a landing in Trinidad and overflight of Jamaica. London, although referring the request to the government of Trinidad -- which voiced no objection -- retains approval authority until Trinidad and Jamaica become independent in August.


The TU-114 arrived at Conakry on 10 July, completing the first leg of the survey flight. It is scheduled to leave Guinea on the 12th for Havana, via Trinidad and Jamaica, carrying 18 passengers.

Derived from the TU-95 heavy bomber, the TU-114 -- named "Russia" -- is unique among world transports because of its size and high cruising speed, which approaches that of pure jet transports. It can carry 120 passengers on long-range operations of over 5,000 miles. (~~TOP SECRET~~ [])

SOURCE: Am Council Port of Spain #15 9 July (~~CONF~~)
State of London #179 9 July (~~CONF~~)

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
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14 July 1962

Increased Discontent Reported in Cuba



Opposition to the Castro regime has gained strength in the past few months as a result of police brutality and the serious shortage of foodstuffs, according to a message from the Brazilian Charge in Havana. Other reports indicate that Che Guevara is worried about the economic situation and that Raul Castro's recent trip to Moscow may have been concerned with soliciting foodstuffs as well as more sophisticated military hardware.

Fidel Castro has reportedly resorted to reviving the "symbolic past" -- i.e. the "heroic phase" of his own campaign -- to inspire continued revolutionary sacrifice. In spite of his efforts, however, small disorganized resistance groups remain, whose isolated acts of sabotage and violence incense the regime.




Comment: Although Castro's government faces serious economic difficulties, it maintains effective control. An assassination attempt -- especially if Fidel were himself the target -- might well bring on a reign of terror. ~~(TOP SECRET~~ 

Sources:



~~TOP SECRET~~



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19 July 1962

Cuban-USSR Agreement for Air Route Moscow to Havana

Cuban and Soviet officials signed a treaty in Havana on 17 July establishing regular TU-114 flights between Moscow and Havana via Conakry, reportedly starting in September. An AEROFLOT TU-114 made a survey flight of the new route on 12 and 13 July, which required 21 hours flying time and went over Trinidad and Jamaica.

Comment: This agreement, which establishes the first regular Moscow-Havana air route, follows recent Soviet civil air agreements with several Middle East and African countries.

Although the Moscow-Conakry-Havana route is longer than the one previously flown via Gander, it will obviate the necessity of Canadian observers on two legs of the flight. Because of long distances between landing points, TU-114's will have to be used unless other landing rights are obtained. Such rights may be sought from Trinidad or Jamaica after they become independent in August. Trinidad might be willing to make an agreement with the Soviets, thus providing the Bloc one more point of contact in this hemisphere. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Sources: FBIS 17 July
Emb Moscow 137 - 16 July (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 July 1962

Cuban Propaganda Directed at Guantanamo

The Cuban press has recently stepped up its campaign against the US, charging numerous territorial violations and other acts of provocation. Castro has reiterated accusations of illegal US occupation of the Guantanamo Base but continues to deny he would use force to take it. He may be preparing to lay formal claims before an international juridical organization, as he has threatened to do at an "appropriate time".

During the past few days, Cuban propaganda has been keyed to the "26th of July celebration". COMNAVBASE Guantanamo does not expect "harassment" of the base during the celebration but has increased security precautions. ~~(SECRET)~~


Sources: COMNAVBASE GTMO 242207Z Jul (S)

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
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30 July 1962



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4 August 1962

Soviet Shipping to Cuba

Since mid-July five Soviet passenger and 11 cargo ships have been noted in unusual voyages to Cuba. The cargo ships were all declared to be lightly loaded -- some had trucks on deck -- and made false statements of destination when leaving the Black Sea, a condition and procedure characteristic of ships carrying military cargo.

The passenger ships are reportedly engaged in transporting agricultural experts to Cuba and on their return voyages taking Cuban personnel, probably including many students, to the USSR or other European Bloc countries. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ []

Sources: []

CINCLANT 251731Z July
CINCLANT 022141Z August

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

7 August 1962

Cuba Reportedly Plans Fake Invasion

The Government of Cuba is planning a fake invasion of the northern coast of Las Villas Province on 8 August, according to a "fairly reliable" source of Commander, Naval Base, Guantanamo. US equipment captured at Playa Giron is reportedly to be used in the "invasion", and its purpose would be to capture Cubans who might try to join an invading force.

Comment: Similar reports, recurrent over the past two years, have -- except for the August 1959 incident -- proved false. Although evidence to support the current report is lacking, such a move is possible, particularly in view of the increase in opposition activities and the Government's failure to eradicate them. ~~(SECRET)~~

Source: DNI 04183Z(S)

8 August 1962

SUPPLEMENTMOVEMENT OF LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS TO CUBA
(REFER TO CHARTS, FOLLOWING)


Since mid-July, 32 Soviet merchant ships have been observed, or are now believed, en route to Cuba, an unprecedented number for such a brief time span. They include five passenger ships (two from the Black Sea and three from the Baltic), reportedly transporting a total of 3,025 personnel, and 27 cargo ships (15 from the Black Sea and 12 from the Baltic), most of which appeared to be carrying cargoes somewhat below their full capacities.

Most of these ships are probably involved in fulfilling the various Soviet-Cuban agreements -- one of which placed considerable emphasis on agricultural assistance -- signed during the first half of 1962. Moscow announced that the largest of the passenger types was transporting agricultural specialists and students returning to Cuba.

Twelve of the cargo ships from the Black Sea had declared for African ports, most with varying amounts of technical, agricultural and general cargo and one with vehicles. The false declarations and light loading are indicative of arms shipments. Moreover, among the ships from the Baltic, two sailed via Murmansk and are following the route used by the Soviet merchant ships which delivered motor torpedo boats and subchasers to Cuba earlier this year. (SECRET)

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



18 August 1962


Soviet ECM Equipment Identified in Cuba

Recent observations indicate the USSR may be equipping Cuba with electronic countermeasure equipment.

On 9 August, a convoy of 12 Soviet GAZ-63 vehicles-- apparently containing CHEESE BRICK, Soviet ECM equipment-- driven by Soviet or Bloc personnel was observed parked near Sancti Spiritus. On 12 August a convoy of 24 of the same type vehicles was observed near Pinar Del Rio. Each convoy was followed by a small olive green bus carrying about 30 Soviet or Bloc personnel. (non-Chinese). CHEESE BRICK--a land-based X-band radar jammer used against airborne targets is effective to approximately 30 miles.



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20 August 1962


SUPPLEMENTSOVIET BLOC ARMS AND TROOP MOVEMENTS TO CUBA

Raul Castro's recent visit to Moscow has sparked numerous rumors and wide-ranging speculation on military developments in Cuba. One report states that his purpose was to gain Cuba's membership in the Warsaw Pact. Having failed in this, however, he settled for a substitute agreement whereby the Soviets were to place two divisions from the "armies of the Socialist Bloc" in Cuba with free rein in military matters.

COMNAVBASE Guantanamo reported receipt of recent information indicating that 500-1,000 fully-equipped Chinese troops had arrived in Cuba. A Spanish language broadcast in Miami previously announced the arrival of 4,000 Soviet troops. Information has also been received indicating the introduction of electronic countermeasure equipment with about 30 Soviet technicians and the receipt of more sophisticated radar equipment.

Although the Soviet Bloc has increased its efforts to aid the faltering Cuban economy and has probably shipped some military items recently--including electronics, transportation, and construction equipment--the specifics are not known. Reliable intelligence confirms the shipment of trucks, tractors, a helicopter and some naval patrol craft, type and number of which are as yet undetermined.


It has been accepted that between 26 July and 7 August five Soviet passenger ships reached Cuba. Prior to their arrival, TASS announced it would send Soviet technicians to Cuba, return Cuban students who have been training in the Bloc, and bring new students back to the USSR. Although none declared for Cuba in transiting the Baltic Sea, two of these ships had a listing of 1,905 passengers, and two, with a capacity of 730, were sighted with passengers on board. There is no information available on the fifth ship, although it had a passenger capacity of 365. If troop-loaded, these ships could have carried over 10,000.



There is no reliable evidence that Soviet Bloc or Chinese troop units have arrived or will arrive in the near future. There are, however, 40-50,000 Orientals, long-time residents of Cuba, some of whom may be members of the Cuban militia. In addition, it is accepted that there has been a recent arrival of a number of economic and agricultural technicians as well as some Soviet Bloc military advisors.

Cuba has no pressing need for Bloc troop units; its internal security problem is not beyond Havana's control. There is, however, a need for economic advisors as well as military technicians to assist in maintaining, installing, and training Cuban armed forces in use of its Soviet Bloc equipment.

(~~TOP SECRET~~  NOFORN)



~~TOP SECRET~~

27 August 1962

Havana Bombardment May be Forerunner of Attempted Uprising

Exiled Cuban leaders, who claim success for the bombardment of Havana on 25 August, also state that landings were made concurrently in Pinar del Rio Province and that affiliated student groups from Havana have taken to the mountains, as guerrillas. There is no confirmation of the latter two circumstances; anti-Castro elements in Cuba, however, reportedly plan to "unleash" a general uprising late in August, according to information reaching the French Ambassador in Havana.

Opposition leaders outside the country are attempting to capitalize on the well-publicized reports of new and increased shipments of Bloc arms and personnel to obtain active support against Castro. Without such aid they are unlikely to try a major internal attack on the militarily strong regime.

Castro will probably use the Havana shelling, as well as alleged US overflights, as justification for further Bloc military materiel and as the basis for an anti-US appeal to the UN. Such an appeal may call for aid in ousting the US from the Naval Base at Guantanamo.

(SECRET)

SOURCE: US Emb. Paris 984, 26 Aug 1962
FBIS
Press

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 August 1962

SUPPLEMENTSOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS TO CUBA INCREASE SHARPLY

Soviet shipping to Cuban ports this year is up about 33 per cent over the comparable eight month period in 1961. August promises the highest number of monthly Soviet Bloc ship arrivals since Castro began trading with the Communist Bloc; approximately 60 ships are expected before the first of September.

The most unusual aspect of recent deliveries is the arrival, or scheduled arrival, during the past four weeks of 11 passenger ships with a combined capacity of 5,500 persons, carrying Bloc and Cuban personnel from the USSR. Troops are evidently not included among the passengers, who are mostly Soviet industrial, agricultural and possibly military technicians and advisors. Soviet tourists and Cuban students returning from special training programs in the Soviet Bloc make up the remainder.

The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba, its largest non-Bloc trading partner. This trade--worth about 875 million dollars in 1961--will probably exceed one billion dollars in 1962.

The expected 60 Soviet Bloc ship arrivals in August will roughly double the monthly average for the first seven months of 1962. The 1961 average was about 25 ships per month. Between 10 and 15 of the monthly arrivals continue to be tankers.

~~(SECRET)~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

SOVIET DRY CARGO/PASSENGER SHIPS BELIEVED INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A. NAKHIMOV	PAS	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	CONAKRY, GUINEA HAVANA 8/6/62	1,106 Tons general cargo and 1,540 passengers	Military personnel observed on deck. Ship has passenger capacity of 1,540.
ALEKSANDROVSK	CG	BALTIC	CUBA 8/1/62		4 Army trucks on deck.
ALMETYEVSK	CG	BALTIC	CUBA 8/5/62		17 Tank trucks on deck.
ATKARSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 8/17/62		Army trucks and boats on deck.
BALTIYSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 8/7/62		Trucks on deck.
BELORETSK	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	ACCRA, GHANA HAVANA 8/24/62	1,700 Tons general cargo	Army vehicles and cranes on deck.
BERDYANSK	CG	BALTIC	CUBA 8/16/62		
B. KHMELNITSKIY	CG	BLACK SEA (NOVOROSSIYSK)	MEDITERRANEAN FOR ORDERS	1,469 Tons technical materials	
DIVNOGORSK	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	MEDITERRANEAN FOR ORDERS HAVANA 8/2/62	750 Tons of automobiles	
DOLMATOVO	CG	BALTIC	SANTIAGO 8/19/62		8 Bulldozers, 20 POL semi- trailers, 10 personnel trucks and unidentified equipment covered with tarpaulins on deck.
DUBOSSARY	CG	BLACK SEA (FEODOSIYA)	CONAKRY, GUINEA HAVANA 8/7/62	965 Tons general cargo	Pressure tanks on deck.
DVINOLES	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 8/12/62		1 Large wooden box, 6 troop trucks, and 3 small trucks on deck.

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
LENINOGORSK	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>CONAKRY, GUINEA</u> HAVANA 8/17/62	1,915 Tons general cargo	5 Fuel trucks and 3 ca: ails on deck.
LESOZAVODSK	CG	BALTIC AND MURMANSK	<u>HAVANA</u> 8/4/62		1 Helicopter and boats on deck.
LIGOV	CG	BALTIC	<u>CUBA</u> 8/1/62		Trucks on deck.
M. ULYANOVA	PAS	BALTIC			Passenger capacity 340 10 Passengers observed on deck.
M. GOVOROV	CG	BALTIC	<u>HAVANA</u> 8/24/62		2 Cranes, 6 bulldozers and crates on deck.
MEDNOGORSK	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>ACCRA, GHANA</u> HAVANA 8/9/62	1,325 Tons of technical materials	
M. BARDIN	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>CONAKRY, GUINEA</u> HAVANA 8/18/62	1,438 Tons general cargo	Army trucks and army oil trucks on deck.
M. BAYKOV	CG	BLACK SEA (NOVOROSSIYSK)	<u>CASABLANCA, MOROCCO</u> CUBA 8/25/62	1,400 Tons general cargo	Army trucks and cranes on deck.
M. KURAKO	CG	BLACK SEA (POTI)	<u>CONAKRY, GUINEA</u> HAVANA 8/3/62	2,350 Tons general cargo	Olive drab tank trucks, and personnel-carrying trucks on deck.
MICHURINSK	CG	BALTIC			
M. URITSKIY	PAS	BALTIC			Passenger capacity 340
N. BURDENKO	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>GHANA</u>	1,423 Tons general cargo	
N. PIROGOV	CG	BLACK SEA (NOVOROSSIYSK)	<u>TAKORADI, GHANA</u> HAVANA 8/12/62	1,299 Tons general cargo	Trucks on deck.

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
F. KURCHATOV	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>ACCRA, GHANA</u> CUBA 8/7/62	1,131 Tons general cargo	Cargo trucks on deck.
F. VAVILOV	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>CONAKRY, GUINEA</u> HAVANA 8/12/62	3,500 Tons technical materials	Trucks on deck.
GRUZIYA	PAS	BALTIC (LENINGRAD)	<u>HAVANA, CUBA</u>	Passenger and canned foods	100 Male/female personnel on deck. Ship's passenger capacity estimated at 1,000.
I. MECHNIKOV	CG	BLACK SEA (NOVOROSSIYSK)	<u>LE HAVRE, FRANCE</u>	11,260 Tons general cargo	
IZHEVSK	CG	BALTIC	<u>HAVANA</u> 8/11/62		6 Jet engine type containers, 5 crane trucks, 8 flatbed trucks and olive drab trucks on deck.
KHABAROVSK	PAS	BALTIC (PROBABLY LENINGRAD)	<u>HAVANA, CUBA</u>		Passenger capacity 340.
K. VISHNEVSKIY	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>ACCRA, GHANA</u> <u>ISABELA las VILLAS</u> 8/15/62	1,300 Tons general cargo	Reportedly (F-2) unloaded military vehicles, 8 tanks and ambulances.
KIMOVSK	CG	BALTIC	<u>HAVANA</u> 8/11/62		Trucks on deck.
KISLOVODSK	CG	BALTIC	<u>CUBA</u> 8/6/62		26 Trucks and 10 large covered crates on deck.
KRASNOGRAD	CG	BALTIC (PROBABLY LENINGRAD)	<u>HAVANA</u> 8/16/62		30 - 35 Trucks on deck.
KURA	CG	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>MEDITERRANEAN</u> <u>FOR ORDERS</u> HAVANA 8/7/62	2,427 Tons grain	
LABINSK	CG	BLACK SEA (ILICHEVSK)	<u>CASABLANCA,</u> <u>MOROCCO</u>	1,375 Tons general cargo	
LATVIYA	PAS	BLACK SEA (ODESSA)	<u>CONAKRY, GUINEA</u>	310 Passengers	Passenger capacity 340.

~~TOP SECRET~~

31 August 1962

US Navy Aircraft Fired on by Patrol Vessels off Cuba

An unarmed US Navy S2F twin piston-engine aircraft was fired on by two surface craft in international waters some 12 miles off the northern coast of Cuba at 1640 EDT on 30 August. The aircraft was fired on from a distance of about 700 yards while flying at a low altitude.

The pilot of the aircraft described the patrol-type vessel as similar to the Cuban GC-107 Habana Class. Each was armed with two single-barrel gun mounts. The pilot could not positively identify the nationality of the craft.

~~(SECRET)~~~~TOP SECRET~~

1 September 1962

Cuban Armed Forces Alerted

Cuban armed forces and security forces have been placed in an alert status, according to recent intercepted military communications, probably because of concern over rumors of an anti-Castro uprising. The army and security forces have cancelled all passes and troops have been restricted to barracks. One intercepted message from the Fifth Army Corps in Camaguey stated that anti-insurgent operations would be conducted. Naval units in the eastern, western and central zones have been ordered on patrol; one unidentified ship in the central naval zone has been directed to prepare for combat and to patrol the southern coast. Air Force communications personnel have been alerted and all flights cancelled.

(SECRET [redacted])

SOURCES: 2/O/CUM/T13-62 (SECRET [redacted])
2/LR/CUN/R 248-62 (SECRET [redacted])
COMWESTFOR 31045Z (SECRET)
2/RV/CUA/RO1-62 (SECRET [redacted])
2/O/CUB/T 165-62 (SECRET [redacted])

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

4 September 1962

Cuba Receives More Soviet Aid

The Soviet-Cuban communique of 2 September announcing new military and economic aid "so long as the threat from imperialist quarters exists" shows up as primarily a propaganda ploy. At the same time, it confirms Moscow's willingness to continue to support Castro.

Soviet ships continue to dock and unload under strict security. Shipments in July and August appear to have consisted largely of transportation, construction, communications, and electronics equipment. As a result of the reported agreement, however, an increased number of arms for internal security and defense against invasion and guerrilla activities may be sent to Cuba.

Meanwhile Cuban military and security forces remain in an alert status. The Central Naval district ordered battle stations manned from dusk to dawn on 31 August and MIG aircraft appear to be active in coastal patrols. Rumors of a general uprising in the near future continue but there is no evidence of any significant increase in opposition activities.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SOURCES: USN 850 CCN 160745

020331Z 6 Sep 62 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]2/0/CUN/T53-62 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Press

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

6 September 1962

Cuba Receiving Missiles and Defense Equipment

In a departure from previous patterns in shipments to Cuba, the Soviet Bloc has recently delivered SA-2 surface-to-air missiles and the associated radars. The SA-2 has an horizontal range of 25-30 nautical miles and a maximum effective altitude of 60,000 feet, with a limited capability up to 80,000 feet. Launching site construction has been noted in at least nine locations, and a few of the sites may be operational. Many of the newly-arrived Bloc technicians are believed to be associated with the missile activity, and Soviet personnel will undoubtedly man the sites for a long period.

Other materiel received includes medium (T34) and heavy tanks, light and heavy artillery tractors, 130mm field guns, amphibious trucks (similar to the US Duck), and antiaircraft fire control radar. The Navy has received at least seven, possibly eight Komar-class boats which carry two launchers for cruise-type, surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 10 to 15 nautical miles. In addition to this material, other transportation, communications, and electronics equipment, not specifically identified, has also been delivered.

The exact types and quantities of military materiel received by Cuba since 1 July cannot be determined, but all of it is defensive in character and the Cubans are not being provided with an independent offensive capability. The acquisition of this equipment, an additional heavy burden on the tottering Cuban economy, is clear evidence of Cuban concern over the possibility of invasion, internal uprisings, and violations of air space and territorial waters, as well as of Soviet determination to maintain Castro in power.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

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8 September 1962

French Comment on Soviet Intention in Cuba

France considers the situation in Cuba to be "extremely serious," according to a French Foreign Office official. In commenting on Soviet objectives there, he stated that the Soviet buildup might be designed to increase pressure on the US at a time when Berlin was causing tension. Soviet moves in Berlin could then be matched by simultaneous activities in Cuba.

Moscow might also be establishing a strong base in Cuba, the official said, in order to provoke US protests so that the Soviets could open debate on the US having bases in Europe and the Middle East. Another aim, he remarked, might even be to push the US into taking some forceful action which would justify Soviet complaints or propaganda in the UN and other world forums.

Although the French report is speculative, the scope of Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests strongly that basic Soviet objectives do go beyond support of Castro. The Soviets probably see their actions as a means not only of extending their influence into a predominantly US sphere but of compounding Washington's international problems.

(~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

SOURCE: Amb Emb Paris #1141 5 Sep (~~SECRET~~)

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 September 1962

More SA-2 Sites and MIG-21 Reported in Cuba

The magnitude of recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba has again been revealed by a report, [redacted] of 3 additional SA-2 sites. This [redacted] raises the total of confirmed sites to twelve. Construction in other areas of Cuba, including Oriente Province, may result in more SA-2 installations.

Equally important is the first proof of the presence of MIG-21 fighters. This [redacted] one MIG-21 and 13 probable aircraft shipping crates at Santa Clara International airfield. The crates may contain additional aircraft of this high altitude (60,000 ft) interceptor type. Cuba has previously received about 60 MIG-type aircraft, including MIG-15s, MIG-17s, and MIG-19s.

(~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

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10 September 1962


Cubans May Plan Harassment of US Patrols

The buzzing of two US aircraft on routine patrol in the Florida Straits by a reported MIG-17 fighter on 8 September may indicate an increase in Cuban aggressiveness and plans for harassment of US patrols.

~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: Precis run as Item (Margaret Peed - 9 Sep 62)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

12 September 1962

Merchant Ships Attacked off Cuba

A Cuban and a British merchant ship reportedly were attacked off the north coast of Cuba on 11 September. The incidents followed a recent public announcement by Cuban exile groups that merchantmen carrying goods to Cuba would be subject to attack. There were also reports that the ALPHA 66 organization planned action for 10 or 11 September. The extent of damage to the ships is not known. Castro has denounced the shelling as an act of piracy.

Recent Cuban military measures--which include increased MIG flight activity and coastal patrols in the eastern area since 31 August--were probably motivated by concern over opposition activities and by a desire to display a strong military posture in the hope of a deterring international anti-Castro groups.

~~(TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]SOURCE: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]--Margaret Peed 11 Sep 62~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX J

EXCERPTS FROM BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESEARCH MEMORANDA AND
INTELLIGENCE NOTES

This annex contains excerpts from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Research Memoranda and Intelligence Notes. These publications are disseminated throughout the intelligence community as well as to the highest levels of the Department of State. On occasion they are sent overseas and are sometimes made available to the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

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17 September 1962

SUPPLEMENT

SOVIET DRY CARGO/PASSENGER SHIPS CURRENTLY IN CUBAN TRADE

Eighteen Soviet dry cargo and two Soviet passenger ships have arrived at Cuban ports since 31 August. Believed en route to Cuba are an additional 26 dry cargo ships, at least half of which may be transporting military cargoes.

At this point, it appears that Soviet ship arrivals at Cuba during September will probably exceed the 42 recorded in August.

(SECRET)

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<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
DIVNOGORSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 9/6/62		
DOBRUSCH	CG	ODESSA	HAVANA 9/9/62	4,000 Tons general	10 Tank car trucks and 10 cylindrical containers on deck.
P. KURCHATOV	CG	ODESSA	ORAN, ALGERIA NOW ENROUTE	9,500 Tons oil	Ship lightly loaded.
E. LEBEDEV	CG	NOVOROSIYSK	GHANA NOW ENROUTE	1,388 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded.
*P. VAVILOV	CG	ODESSA	CONAKRY, GUINEA NOW ENROUTE	3,500 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded.
P. Z. KYURI	CG	ODESSA	CONAKRY, GUINEA NOW ENROUTE	2,400 Tons general	
I. SECHENOV	CG	ODESSA	CASABLANCA, MOROCCO HAVANA 9/10/62	1,222 Tons general (possibly wheat)	9-11 Probable oil tanks, 6 large wooden crates probably contain- ing engines, 1 truck crane, 1 truck and 3-4 small crates on deck.
IZHEVSK	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
K. ZELINSKIY	CG	ODESSA	CONAKRY, GUINEA HAVANA 9/9/62	1,531 Tons general	3 Motorized cranes and 10 trucks on deck.
*KIMOVSK	CG	ODESSA	CONAKRY, GUINEA NOW ENROUTE	2,200 Tons general	
KIROVSK	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
KISLOVODSK	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
*KURA	CG	ODESSA	CUBA NOW ENROUTE	1,838 Tons canned goods	Ship lightly loaded.

* INDICATES SHIP IS PROBABLY EN ROUTE CUBA

29

17 Sept 1962 DIA-CIIC

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SOVIET DRY CARGO/PASSENGER SHIPS ARRIVING OR EN ROUTE CUBA SINCE 31 AUGUST 1962

~~SECRET~~

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
ALAPAYEVSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 9/5/62		20 Trucks on deck.
ALEKSANDROVSK	CG	BALTIC	CUBA 9/7/62		No cargo seen on deck.
ALMETYEVSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 9/16/62		
ALATYR'LES	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
*ANGARSKLES	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
ARKHANGEL'SKLES	CG	MURMANSK	CUBA (PROBABLY HAVANA) 9/7/62		8 Trucks, 1 station wagon and 6 metal storage tanks on deck.
ATKARSK	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
BALTIYSK	CG	BALTIC	NOW ENROUTE		
B. KHMELNITSKIY	CG	FEODOSIYA	MEDITERREAN FOR ORDERS HAVANA 9/5/62	1,469 Tons technical materials	9 Military and 1 gasoline truck as well as truck beds covered with canvas on deck.
*B. SUGHANOV	CG	ODESSA	GHANA NOW ENROUTE	1,140 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded.
BRATSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 9/10/62		
CHERNYAKHOVSK	CG	ODESSA	CONAKRY, GUINEA NOW ENROUTE	1,911 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded and transited Turkish Straits at night.

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
LABINSK	CG	ILICHEVSK	CASABLANCA, MOROCCO HAVANA 9/3/62	1,375 Tons general	18 Trucks on deck.
LATVIYA	PAS	ODESSA	CONAKRY, GUINEA HAVANA 9/ 5/62	365 Passengers and 450 Tons general.	Had 278 passengers and no cargo aboard upon departure.
LENINOGORSK	CG	BALTIC	<u> </u> NOW ENROUTE		8 Trucks on deck.
L. KOMSOMOL	CG	ODESSA	CASABLANCA, MOROCCO NOW ENROUTE	3,000 Tons general	
LESOZAVODSK	CG	BALTIC	<u> </u> NOW ENROUTE		
LIGOV	CG	BALTIC	<u> </u> NOW ENROUTE		
MEDNOGORSK	CG	ODESSA	GHANA NOW ENROUTE	2,218 Tons technical materials	Ship lightly loaded. 19 Military trucks on deck.
M. KURAKO	CG	ODESSA	ACCRA, GHANA NOW ENROUTE	2,005 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded and transited Turkish Straits at night.
MICHURINSK	CG	BALTIC	<u> </u> HAVANA 9/11/62		Large crates on deck.
*N. PIROGOV	CG	ODESSA	CASABLANCA, MOROCCO NOW ENROUTE	1,065 Tons automobiles	Ship lightly loaded.
OKHOTSK	CG	VLADIVOSTOK	CUBA NOW ENROUTE	Rice and grain harvesting combines and timber.	
OMSK	CG	ODESSA	GHANA SANTIAGO 9/8/62	10,900 Tons gas oil	6 Jeeps, 10 trucks and 1 crate on deck.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOVIET DRY CARGO/PASSENGER SHIPS ARRIVING OR EN ROUTE CUBA SINCE 31 AUGUST 1962

~~SECRET~~

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DECLARED FOR ARRIVED</u>	<u>REPORTED CARGO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
P. BONIVUR	CG	ODESSA	LE HAVRE, FRANCE CIENFUEGOS 9/2/62	1,608 Tons general	Agricultural machinery on deck.
POBEDA	PAS	BALTIC	HAVANA 9/12/62		
POLTAVA	CG	ODESSA	ACCRA, GHANA CUBA 9/16/62	2,000 Tons machinery	Ship lightly loaded.
S. BOTKIN	CG	ODESSA	GHANA NOW ENROUTE	1,250 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded. 18 Large trucks on deck.
SOLNECHNOGORSK	CG	ODESSA	GHANA NOW ENROUTE	2,875 Tons general	Ship lightly loaded. 2 Mobile cranes. 1 truck and 2 truck cabs on deck.
SRETENSK	CG	BALTIC	HAVANA 9/10/62		
USOLYE	CG	ODESSA AND KALININGRAD	HAVANA 9/7/62	5,000 Tons fertilizer	8 Large covered boxes on deck.
USTYUZENA	CG	ODESSA	CUBA NOW ENROUTE	5,000 Tons grain	Towing a floating crane.
VOLGOLES	CG	BALTIC	CUBA 9/2/62		

17 Sept 1962 DIA-CIIC

* Indicates ship is probably en route Cuba.

32

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

18 September 1962

Coastal Defense Missile Site in Cuba

A coastal defense cruise-missile site has been installed near Banes in Oriente Province, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The site reportedly features two revetments, each containing a rail-launcher approximately 35 feet long. These launchers are connected by cable with a Soviet WHIFF-type radar and other electronic vans. Canvas-covered missile-transporters and other supporting equipment are also positioned within the site, which appears to be a field installation as opposed to a permanent facility.

The absence of significant military installations near Banes suggests that this is a training site. The construction of similar sites in other areas may be expected. The missile may have a range of up to 35 nautical miles.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 September 1962

SPOONREST Radar in Cuba

A signal from a surface-to-air-missile-associated radar, SPOONREST, has recently been intercepted from the Havana-Mariel area in Cuba. SPOONREST, can intercept a medium bomber at 20,000 feet at a distance of 150 nautical miles. Primarily a warning-acquisition radar associated with the FRUITSET SA-2 guidance radar, SPOONREST operates in the very-high-frequency band with a radio frequency of 155-157 megacycles.

Intercept of a SPOONREST signal from Cuba indicates that at least one of the 12 SA-2 sites there will soon be operational. Cubans also have the FRUITSET radar, although no FRUITSET signals have yet been detected.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CINCLANT Msg 171942Z Sep 62

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

21 September 1962

Reference to Bloc "Volunteers" for Cuba

Recent references to "volunteers" for Cuba in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Eastern Europe are believed to be indicative of enlisted personnel's reaction to political briefings on Cuba and to troop indoctrination through calls for "volunteers." The Soviets can be expected to send additional military specialists to train Cubans in the more sophisticated weapons and to maintain the equipment. The references [REDACTED] to "volunteers", however, appear to be an aspect of Moscow's propaganda campaign. Using the 11 September Tass statement as a take-off point, Cuba evidently is a major topic at political gatherings of Soviet military personnel in Eastern Europe.

~~(TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

22 September 1962

More Guided Missile Patrol Boats for Cuba



The accompanying photo of an earlier shipment to Cuba shows the crates on deck and their probably contents.

~~(SECRET~~ NOFORN)

SOURCE: ONI SIB 62-38, 19Sep62 (SECRET)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

22 September 1962

Reports of Submarine Accompanying Soviet Merchant Ships to Cuba

No reliable information, apart from a disappearing radar contact of a US Navy P2V aircraft, supports the report of two submarines accompanying a group of four Soviet merchant ships heading toward Cuba. Intensive investigation of the area by US Naval forces confirms the presence of four Soviet dry cargo ships and one Soviet tanker in the area but fails to substantiate a submarine.

The source of the initial report, the commercial tug FORT JOHNSON, has provided exaggerated and distorted information on at least three occasions.

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: Telephone conversation with OPNAV ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
COMASWFORLANT 210303Z ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
CINCLANT
(Mr. Davis 21 Sep 62)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

24 September 1962

Cuban Military Situation

Cuban military forces are engaged in a variety of exercises, according to COMINT, including MIG combat training, and there is some evidence that an IFF system is in operation. Helicopters were noted dropping paratroops for the first time on 14 September in an exercise near Playa Baracoa airfield, 10 miles southwest of Havana. This field is the primary Cuban maintenance and assembly area for the approximately 11 Soviet MI-1 and 12 MI-4 helicopters Cuba has received. Helicopters had earlier been noted in low-level maneuvers and in fire support of ground missions. Coastal gunnery practice has taken place north of Santa Clara with the fall of the shot extending six miles to seaward. Naval exercises by the Soviet-furnished P-6 boats have been in progress off the north coast, and the first operational field communications involving Cuban tanks were noted on 21 September.

Cuban pilots may have been training in IL-28s at the Azov Bomb Range in Southwestern USSR, although Cuba is not known to have received any Soviet bombers. On 16 August, at least four pilots using Spanish terminology were engaged in live and practice bombing at the Range.

The site near Santa Cruz del Norte identified as an SA-2 missile site may be a coastal-defense cruise-missile site of the type identified at Banes. This would bring the number of identified coastal-defense missile sites to two and reduce the identified SA-2 sites to 11, but it is probable that there are or will be more of each.

(~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] NOFORN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

SOURCES: [REDACTED] (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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24 September 1962

SUPPLEMENTCOASTAL DEFENSE MISSILE SITE IN CUBA


The probable surface-to-surface cruise missile installation at Banes in eastern Cuba appears to be a short-range, naval-associated coastal defense weapon of Soviet origin. There are similarities between the Banes facility and recently photographed sites at Lien Shan and Port Arthur in Communist China. The major dissimilarity is in the apparent permanency of the Chinese sites and the field-type appearance of the Banes installation. The latter has not yet been directly associated with any specific missile system.

Characteristics and performance of the missile have not been determined, but a range of no more than 35 nautical miles seems likely. The vehicle may be in the 4,000-pound class, with a warhead weight of about 1,000 pounds.

An intensive study of all available data on the Cuban site is being made by a working group of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)
(TOP SECRET NOFORN)

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


26 September 1962


Third Coastal-Defense Missile Site Identified in Cuba

A new missile-associated facility has been located about 10 nautical miles east of Havana, near Campo Florida. It is similar to those near Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte which have been identified as coastal-defense cruise-missile sites.

Equipment includes two unrevetted canvas-covered probable launchers 175 feet apart, two probable vans, and seven canvas-covered trailer-type vans--two of which are probably electronic associated. All of the equipment is interconnected by cable. Also within the enclosed area are six canvas-covered missile transporters, six trailer vans, four truck vans, four tents and seven unidentified pieces of equipment. Whether this is an operational missile site is not yet clear. ~~(SECRET)~~ NOFORN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION



~~TOP SECRET~~



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26 September 1962

SUPPLEMENTRECENT SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS

During the past six weeks, 22 Soviet dry cargo ships are believed to have carried and/or towed military equipment to six non-Bloc countries plus North Viet-Nam (see tables). Another five Soviet ships are believed on the way to three non-Bloc countries with additional military goods.

Deliveries probably have or will include 16 "KOMAR"-class guided-missile motor boats and 13 to 15 possible MIG-19 aircraft to Cuba; four minesweepers--one to Egypt, two to Indonesia, and possibly one to Algeria; and two torpedo retrievers to Yemen. Additionally, en route Indonesia are a cruiser, two destroyer escorts, and a submarine chaser. Three other countries, Iraq, Morocco and North Viet-Nam, have probably received military shipments during the period.

~~(SECRET~~)~~TOP SECRET~~

27 September 1962

Two More Soviet Passenger Ships to Cuba

Nine Soviet passenger ships have gone to Cuba in the past two months. The most recent are NIKOLAYEVSK which arrived at Havana on its second trip in a month and MARIYA ULYANOVA, now about 500 miles southeast of Bermuda, also on a quick repeat trip. Both have come from Baltic ports without using normal communications, an indication of a desire to be undetected. Each has a capacity of about 350 passengers.

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

SOURCE: Various (L/Cdr Pike, 26 Sep 62)



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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27 September 1962

NATO Shipping to Cuba

Merchant ships under the flags of NATO nations made 227 voyages to Cuban ports between May and August 1962, of which 80 per cent were by ships of five countries whose governments assert they lack authority to control shipping of non-strategic materials to Cuba. Official spokesmen for these countries--Greece, the UK, Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands--have also expressed reservations on the principle of such interference. Although Britain is unwilling to join in a general trade blockade of Cuba, British shipowners, whose vessels rank second in number of trips to Cuba, were advised by the Government on 25 September to avoid carrying arms there.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~SOURCES:  25 Sep 1962. files
Press~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

28 September 1962

Additional Surface-to-Air Missile Facilities in Cuba

Three more SA-2 sites have been identified in Cuba--all in Oriente Province. Confirmed air defense missile sites now number 14.

The only missile support site reported thus far is at Santiago de las Vegas.

Comment: The location of these newly reported SA-2 sites in Oriente was expected, and--as the Soviet arming of Cuba continues--identification of other SA-2 sites and support facilities is anticipated.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

29 September 1962

Status of Missile Sites in Cuba

The cruise-type missile site at Banes seems to be operational. the launch area re-
vetments appear complete and that on 26 September a prob-
able missile was located on one of the two launchers.

Santa Cruz del Norte is similar in equipment and configura-
tion to Banes, but no missiles have been reported there.
Campo Florida has certain equipment like that at Banes
but does not have the deployed-site characteristics of
either Banes or Santo Cruz del Norte.

Fourteen SA-2 missile sites in various stages of develop-
ment have now been identified in Cuba. Their six-launch-
position configurations resemble the GUIDELINE missile
complexes in East Germany.

The only missile support base reported so far is at San-
tiago de las Vegas, although there may be several more.
About a month ago, Santiago de las Vegas had 34 missiles
transporters and 12 probable GUIDELINE missiles with as-
sociated equipment indicative of an SA-2 assembly area.
(~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

SOURCE: Various (L/C Sullivan)

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
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1 October 1962

Another SA-2 Site in Cuba

The 15th SA-2 missile site in Cuba has been identified on the Isle of Pines about 1,200 yards south of the Siguanea Airfield runway. The site, which has a circular road and peripheral fence under construction, is described as having six missile launchers (four unrevetted, two with drive-through revetments) and a FRUITSET radar with associated vans and cables to all launchers. Seven missile transporters are positioned about one-half mile to the south. The 15 sites are generally similar, each with a FRUITSET radar in the center of the six launchers. Some are believed operational.

Siguanea Airfield's 6,000-foot runway and aprons were reported serviceable as of 29 September and a 1,000-foot runway extension was under construction. There are two occupied light AA positions 2,000 yards southwest of the runway.

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2 October 1962

A Cruise Missile Site Also on Isle of Pines

A cruise missile site--the fourth detected in Cuba so far--is under construction on the Isle of Pines, adjacent to the SA-2 installation identified previously. The site is similar in configuration and equipment to those at Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte and is located on a hill-top about a mile southwest of Siguanea Airfield.

The site contains two inclined launchers, both connected by cable to a probable WHIFF radar and another unidentified radar. Behind the launchers are seven missile transporters and other vehicles.

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2 October 1962

OAS Countries Meet to Discuss Cuban Problem

The informal OAS meeting opening on 2 October will center around a determination of the extent to which the military buildup in Cuba has caused hardening of attitudes toward Castro since the formal meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers last January. A course of action under consideration is the establishment of an air-sea surveillance of Cuba to prevent clandestine movements of arms and men to other countries in the Caribbean area.

Most of the Central American and Caribbean states strongly favor further collective action against Cuba. All except Mexico, and possibly Haiti, would probably support the air-sea surveillance plan. Some of the South American countries, however, still view the problem primarily as one for the US and Caribbean countries, although Venezuela, Colombia, and Paraguay have consistently sought strong collective action and would probably support the surveillance plan. Argentina's position appears to have hardened since January, and it may now back strong action. Ecuador and Peru also seem to favor a stronger anti-Cuban stand, but the attitudes of Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay are not clear. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has expressed sympathy for the Caribbean countries and might support some form of "containment", but he would probably oppose drastic action.

~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: No sources listed. Sent to EBU as Supplement.

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3 October 1962

Soviet Aeroflot Flights from Moscow to Havana

The Soviet civil airline, Aeroflot, will start weekly round-trip TU-114 flights from Moscow to Havana on 7 October. The flights are to leave Moscow on Sundays and Havana on Fridays.

The aircraft from Moscow will overfly Niger and Mali and land at Conakry, Guinea. The flight from Conakry to Havana will apparently be non-stop and will last ten hours and five minutes. The turboprop TU-114 can carry 120 passengers on flights of over 5,000 miles.

The agreement for regular TU-114 flights from Moscow to Havana by way of Conakry was signed by Cuban and Soviet officials on 17 July.

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6 October 1962

Cuban Air Force Training in Close Support Missions

Five Cuban Air Force MIG's were apparently engaged in close support training on 27 September. Intercepted messages indicated that the MIG gunnery runs were made in co-ordination with a ground tactical air controller. The flight leader was reportedly Soviet.

The exercise seems to have been well planned and successfully executed. Ground targets such as troop concentrations and tanks were singled out, and the attacking fighters were directed through the approach and regrouping phase. Numerous transmissions by the controller were intended to insure that the simulated attack would begin on time. (SECRET)

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6 October 1952

Soviet Military Specialists in Cuba

The arrival of two Soviet passenger ships now on the way to Cuba will bring the total number of Soviet military technicians believed to have entered the country since 25 July to between 5,000 and 6,000. Most of these are probably engaged in training Cubans in the use of recently delivered Soviet arms, especially air and coastal defense missile systems.

Soviet passenger ships carrying the specialists have made 13 trips to Cuba during which a minimum of 4,510 passenger spaces were available. The two ships now en route have a capacity of 1,480. Of the eight ships apparently engaged in transporting these Bloc specialists, four have made or are now on their second voyage to Cuba and two have completed their third.

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8 October 1962

Additional Torpedo Boats Probably on Way to Cuba

Two "P-6"-class Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) were noted as deck cargo aboard the Soviet dry cargo ship DVINOLES which recently left the Baltic. The ship has previously delivered military equipment to Cuba and in August carried two "Komar"-class Guided Missile Patrol Boats (PGMG) from the Baltic to Havana.

Delivery of the additional two "P-6" MTB's would bring to 14 the number received by the Castro regime. In addition to the MTB's, six "Kronshtadt"-class submarine chasers and at least 14 "Komar"-class PGMG have been delivered.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~~~TOP SECRET~~

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8 October 1962

New Missile Site in Oriente Province, Cuba

A new SA-2 missile site has been identified two and a half miles SSE of Manzanillo in Oriente Province. The installation, the 16th located, reportedly has six missile transporters, six missile launchers, a FRUITSET radar with five vans and various other equipment in open storage. None of the equipment is revetted.


The SA-2 sites are at different stages, varying from early construction to possibly operational. The facility at Jigunai, has much of the necessary equipment, but it is not yet emplaced in the familiar SA-2 circular configuration although the road pattern is there.

Three deployed coastal-defense cruise-missile sites have been confirmed; a fourth related facility, which may become a site, has been located. The Banes installation is probably partially operational while those at Santa Cruz del Norte and Sigüanea are in earlier stages of construction. The coastal defense missile-related facility at Campo Florida has equipment similar in configuration and layout to that of the other three, but has no fixed installations and lacks the deployed site pattern.

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9 October 1962


Two More SA-2 Sites in Cuba

The 17th and 18th SA-2 sites in Cuba, apparently under construction, have been identified. One is southwest of Manati in Oriente Province, and the other north-northeast of Senado in Camaguey. Both installations are unvetted and appear to be of the familiar six-launcher pattern with FRUIT SET radar. Twenty-five to 30 SA-2 installations probably would provide complete coverage for the island.


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


11 October 1962


Two More SA-2 Sites in Cuba

The 19th and 20th SA-2 sites have been identified, both in Camaguey Province; one is northeast of Chambas, the other northwest of Esmeralda. The installations are unrevetted and have the usual six launchers with FRUIT SET radar. Construction at the Esmeralda site appears more advanced than at Chambas with the launchers, and possibly the acquisition radar, in place.

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
11 October 1962

IL-28 Jet Light Bombers Probably Delivered to Cuba


Photographic interpretation reveals that Soviet IL-28 (BEAGLE) twin-jet light bombers have probably been delivered to Cuba. The Soviet merchant ship KASIMOV, which arrived in Havana on 30 September, carried 10 large crates on deck, each of the size and configuration required to house an IL-28 fuselage. The IL-28 has been in service since 1950 and has an operational radius of 740 nautical miles at 43,800 feet. (SECRET NOFORN)

SOURCE: Mr. Davis

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
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25 April 1962

Possible Release of Additional Imprisoned Invaders

Dr Sanchez, Chairman of the Families Committee which negotiated the release of the first group of prisoners with Castro, has informed the US State Department that Castro will reportedly release on 28 April an additional 30 prisoners and plans to release those remaining periodically in groups of 100. No mention was made of additional payments.

Comment: There is no confirmation of the planned releases. Castro has been bitterly attacked for demanding ransom for the prisoners and may hope to improve his international standing by releasing them. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: TELEPHONE WITH STATE DEPT

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30 April 1962

Increased Counterrevolutionary Activity

Counterrevolutionary activity has apparently increased throughout Cuba. Five militia companies were reportedly moved to the Baracoa area on 16 April because of dissident activity there, and during the preceding week the commander of a militia battalion, several officers and an estimated 200 men were said to have defected after a fire fight with loyal forces in the Escambray Mountains. A defecting group is supposedly active in Pinar del Rio, while a Cuban Army captain and several hundred troops stationed in the Holguin-Gibara area reportedly went over to the counterrevolutionaries on 15 April.

Sabotage activities are also increasing. Acts of sabotage against power plants and powder magazine in Havana harbor are said to be planned for May Day. The press reports that a 28 April anti-Castro demonstration in Havana was quickly broken up by police action.

Comment: The strengths and locations of the various counterrevolutionary groups are not known, but the activity is apparently still on a small scale and not well co-ordinated. The Cuban Government is sensitive to the potential danger, however, and seems to be moving vigorously against it. The demonstration in Havana is the first reported since last September and may indicate a quickening of anti-Castro activity in the capital as well ~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: COMNAVBASE GTMO 201920Z and 262033Z (C);
[REDACTED] PRESS

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May 1962

CUBA

Cuba is rapidly becoming, in form as well as ideology, a Communist state. All phases of Cuban life, political, socio-economic, and military are steadily-- if not always efficiently -- being reorganized along Communist lines. In accordance with an apparent plan to make Cuba a showplace for Communism in the Western Hemisphere, the Soviet Union and the Bloc continue to furnish massive injections of economic assistance to bolster the faltering Cuban economy. Bloc technicians and advisors are present in Cuba in significant numbers assisting in the reorganization and training of the Armed Forces and in the economic and political reforms undertaken by the Castro regime.

Despite widespread grumblings at shortages -- particularly in basic foodstuffs which have led to their rationing -- and at the increasing prominence of Communists in local government, the great majority of the Cuban population is apathetic and resigned to the Castro regime. Active dissidence has gradually increased since its almost complete disappearance following the April 1961 invasion attempt. However, anti-regime activity remains disorganized and does not offer a significant threat to Castro's position at this time.

Of recent significance have been the admissions by Castro and other Cuban leaders of "errors" in the course of revolution, which, they allege, have caused the current Cuban economic difficulties. Tied in with these admissions of error has been the firing of Anibal Escalante, one of the top, old-line Cuban Communist Party members and a high government official along with several other lesser Communist officials. While these dismissals may merely represent an attempt to provide a scapegoat for the shortcomings of the revolution, they may

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also be indicative of a struggle for power between Castro and his followers on the one hand and the hard-core Communist Party leaders on the other. Even if Escalante's dismissal does, in fact, indicate an attempt by Castro to maintain his pre-eminent position in Cuba at the expense of the Communists, it is doubtful that there will be any open split between Castro and the Communists since they both need each other to reach their objectives.

The Cuban ground forces now consist of a standing army of approximately 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard force of 100,000. The Cuban Air Force has received an estimated 35 MIG 15/17 and 10-12 MIG-19 aircraft, and the Bloc has trained at least 50 jet qualified pilots and an undetermined number of airmen. The Cuban Armed Forces are currently under-going a training and reorganization period. The Army and Militia are being amalgamated into a single organization, and training with Bloc arms and equipment received during the past year and a half has now progressed to combined arms training at the battalion level. The large amounts of Soviet Bloc military equipment and assistance, coupled with a greater emphasis on training, have greatly increased Cuban military capabilities. However, the types of equipment supplied, the nature of the training and the disposition of the Cuban military forces indicates an emphasis on the defensive and internal security role of the Armed Forces. This defensive posture is emphasized by numerous recent reports of construction of underground storage areas for food, fuel and ammunition as well as arms and equipment. To date there is no confirmation of the numerous low-level reports of missile or missile-related activity in Cuba, and it is considered highly unlikely that any such activity is taking place. Recent acquisitions by the Cuban Navy of 12 Bloc-supplied subchasers and 6 PT boats will enhance its capability -- heretofore minimal -- for coastal patrol and interdiction

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
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
of Cubans attempting to escape by sea. Bloc provision of jet fighter aircraft to the Cuban Air Force and an intensive personnel training program, currently in progress, should gradually increase Cuban capabilities in the air.

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
15 June 1962

Cuban Activities Near Guantanamo

Cuban authorities continue to take steps to establish firm control of access to and from the Guantanamo Naval Base. They have designated the area surrounding the base a militarized zone. Farmers in the vicinity have been relocated and strict travel restrictions have been imposed on all roads within six miles of the base. Overland check points exist throughout the area, and there is some indication of the establishment of coastal check points to control the movement of small craft along the coast. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: COMNAVBASE GTMO 062101Z and 11607Z ~~(C)~~

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18 June 1962

Cuban Government Show of Force

The Cuban Government staged a strong military display in Cardenas on 17 June which President Dorticos characterized a "demonstration of the military force of a people in arms to warn our enemies". The display followed popular demonstrations against food shortages, which the President charged were staged by "counter-revolutionaries".

COMMENT: In spite of numerous recent reports of an imminent major counterrevolutionary action and some increase in sabotage and guerrilla activities in recent weeks there is no evidence that the opposition is well enough organized to mount a major effort with any chance of success. Dissatisfaction does, however, appear to be increasing in Cuba. Both the show of force at Cardenas and Dorticos' speech were probably designed to deter the opposition and warn the populace against supporting counterrevolutionaries. ~~(SECRET)~~

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11 July 1962

Soviet Preparations to Establish Civil Air Service to Havana

Moscow has approached the UK for permission for an Aeroflot TU-114 heavy turboprop transport to carry out a survey flight to Havana via Conakry, Guinea, which may include a landing in Trinidad and overflight of Jamaica. London, although referring the request to the government of Trinidad--which voiced no objection--retains approval authority until Trinidad and Jamaica become independent in August.

The TU-114 is scheduled to leave Guinea on 12 July for Havana, via Trinidad and Jamaica; the return trip is to be carried out on the 16th.

Derived from the TU-95 heavy bomber, the TU-114--named "Russia"--is unique among world transports because of its size and high cruising speed, which approaches that of pure jet transports. It can carry 120 passengers on long-range operations over 5,000 miles. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: CON PORT OF SPAIN 15 (C)



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19 July 1962

Cuban-USSR Agreement for Air Route Moscow to Havana

Cuban and Soviet officials signed a treaty in Havana on 17 July establishing regular TU-114 flights between Moscow and Havana via Conakry, reportedly starting in September. An AEROFLOT TU-114 made a survey flight of the new route on 12 and 13 July, which required 21 hours flying time and went over Trinidad and Jamaica.

Comment: This agreement, which establishes the first regular Moscow-Havana air route, follows recent Soviet civil air agreements with several Middle East and African countries.

Although the Moscow-Conakry-Havana route is longer than the one previously flown via Gander, it will obviate the necessity of Canadian observers on two legs of the flight. Because of long distances between landing points, TU-114's will have to be used unless other landing rights are obtained. Such rights may be sought from Trinidad or Jamaica after they become independent in August. Trinidad might be willing to make an agreement with the Soviets, thus providing the Bloc one more point of contact in this hemisphere. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: FBIS (OUO)

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19 July 1962


Brazilian Retired Officers Attempt to Leave for Cuba

Military authorities prevented a group of retired Brazilian Army officers from leaving Brazil for Cuba on 13 July. One of the officers headed a group of 81 Brazilians planning on attending the 26 July celebrations in Cuba. An Air Force officer says retirees from his service were also attempting to go to Cuba at the request of President Goulart.

Comment: Goulart seems to be maintaining his close relations with Cuba, and other recent reports have indicated Communist and pro-Castro success in infiltrating military circles. Most of the present active leadership, however, is strongly anti-Communist. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: MIL ATTACHES RIO DE JANEIRO J-20 (C)

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23 July 1962

Communist Activities in Costa Rica

Costa Rican Communists reportedly plan to have two trainees in Cuba at all times for a two-months' course in guerrilla activities. Upon their return, the trainees are to set up indoctrination courses in the cities of Limon on the Atlantic and Golfito on the Pacific. Two trainees left for Cuba via Mexico on 16 June, possibly to replace or join those who may already be there. A Moscow-trained Costa Rican Communist is also said to be studying agrarian reform methods in Cuba for potential use in Costa Rica. In addition, 13 Costa Rican students, some of whom may be Communists, are to go to the USSR soon for study.

Comment: Indications are that youths from most Latin American countries have at some time received guerrilla training in Cuba. This is the first account, however, of plans for a sustained training program for Costa Ricans. The small and illegal Popular Vanguard (Communist) Party has little influence, but some following in front organizations and among student and labor groups. The Communists recently began to step up their activity among coastal banana workers. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: EMB SAN JOSE WEEKA 28 (C)

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26 July 1962

Cuban Propaganda Directed at Guantanamo

The Cuban press has recently stepped up its campaign against the US, charging numerous territorial violations and other acts of provocation. Castro has reiterated accusations of illegal US occupation of the Guantanamo Base but continues to deny he would use force to take it. He may be preparing to lay formal claims before an international juridical organization, as he has threatened to do at an "appropriate time."

During the past few days, Cuban propaganda has been keyed to the "26th of July celebration." COMNAVBASE Guantanamo does not expect "harassment" of the base during the celebration but has increased security precautions. ~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: PRESS, COMNAVBASE GTMO 242207Z (S)

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7 August 1962

Cuba Reportedly Plans Fake Invasion

The Government of Cuba is planning a fake invasion of the northern coast of Las Villas Province on 8 August, according to a "fairly reliable" source of Commander, Naval Base, Guantanamo. US equipment captured at Playa Giron is reportedly to be used in the "invasion", and its purpose would be to capture Cubans who might try to join an invading force.

Comment: Similar reports, recurrent over the past two years, have -- except for the August 1959 incident -- proved false. Although evidence to support the current report is lacking, such a move is possible, particularly in view of the increase in opposition activities and the Government's failure to eradicate them. ~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: DNI 031813Z ~~(S)~~

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16 August 1962

Anti-Castro Resistance Continues in Cuba

At least five separate fire fights between Cuban troops and anti-Castro insurgents took place between 23 and 28 July, according to information received by COMNAVBASE, Guantanamo. Fifteen Cuban militiamen reportedly defected to the insurgents during the same period.

Comment: Overt opposition to the Castro regime continues on a small scale, and -- while limited in scope and apparently uncoordinated -- insurgent activity is of considerable concern to Castro, who has alluded to "worms" opposing his regime.
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: COMNAVBASE GTMO 131907Z (C)

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27 August 1962

Havana Bombardment May be Forerunner of Attempted Uprising

Exiled Cuban leaders, who claim success for the bombardment of Havana on 25 August, also state that landings were made concurrently in Pinar del Rio Province and that affiliated student groups from Havana have taken to the mountains, as guerrillas. There is no confirmation of the latter two circumstances; anti-Castro elements in Cuba, however, reportedly plan to "unleash" a general uprising late in August, according to information reaching the French Ambassador in Havana.


Opposition leaders outside the country are attempting to capitalize on the well-publicized reports of new and increased shipments of Bloc arms and personnel to obtain active support against Castro. Without such aid they are unlikely to try a major internal attack on the militarily strong regime.

Castro will probably use the Havana shelling, as well as alleged US overflights, as justification for further Bloc military materiel and as the basis for an anti-US appeal to the UN. Such an appeal may call for aid in ousting the US from the Naval Base at Guantanamo. ~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: EMB PARIS 984 (S)

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30 August 1962

SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS TO CUBA INCREASE SHARPLY


Soviet shipping to Cuban ports this year is up about 33 per cent over the comparable eight month period in 1961. August promises the highest number of monthly Soviet Bloc ship arrivals since Castro began trading with the Communist Bloc; approximately 60 ships are expected before the first of September.

The most unusual aspect of recent deliveries is the arrival, or scheduled arrival, during the past four weeks of 9 passenger ships with a combined capacity of 4,800 persons, carrying Bloc and Cuban personnel from the USSR. Troops are evidently not included among the passengers, who are mostly Soviet industrial, agricultural and possibly military technicians and advisors. Soviet tourists and Cuban students returning from special training programs in the Soviet Bloc make up the remainder.

The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba, its largest non-Bloc trading partner. This trade -- worth about 875 million dollars in 1961 -- will probably exceed one billion dollars in 1962.

The expected 60 Soviet Bloc ship arrivals in August will roughly double the monthly average for the first seven months of 1962. The 1961 average was about 25 ships per month. Between 10 and 15 of the monthly arrivals continue to be tankers. ~~(SECRET)~~

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31 August 1962

US Navy Aircraft Fired on by Patrol Vessels off Cuba

An unarmed US Navy S2F twin piston-engine aircraft was fired on by two surface craft in international waters some 12 miles off the northern coast of Cuba at 1640 EDT on 30 August. The aircraft was fired on from a distance of about 700 yards while flying at a low altitude.

The pilot of the aircraft described the patrol-type vessel as similar to the Cuban GC-107 Habana Class. Each was armed with two single-barrel gun mounts. The pilot could not positively identify the nationality of the craft.
(SECRET)

SOURCE: COMWESTFOR 302100Z and 310145Z (8)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 Sept 1962

Cuba Receiving Missiles and Defense Equipment

In a departure from previous patterns in shipments to Cuba, the Soviet Bloc has recently delivered SA-2 surface-to-air missiles and the associated radars. The SA-2 has a horizontal range of 25-30 nautical miles and a maximum effective altitude of 60,000 feet, with a limited capability up to 80,000 feet. Launching site construction has been noted in at least nine locations, and a few of the sites may be operational. Additional sites will probably be constructed. Many of the newly-arrived Bloc technicians are believed to be associated with the missile activity, and Soviet personnel will undoubtedly man the sites for a long period.

Other material received includes medium (T34) and heavy tanks, light and heavy artillery tractors, 130mm field guns, amphibious trucks (similar to the US Duck), and anti-aircraft fire control radar. The Navy has received at least seven, possibly eight Komar-class boats which carry two launchers for cruise-type, surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 10 to 15 nautical miles. In addition to this material, other transportation, communications, and electronics equipment, not specifically identified, has also been delivered.

The exact types and quantities of military materiel received by Cuba since 1 July cannot be determined, but all of it is defensive in character and the Cubans are not being provided with an independent offensive capability. The acquisition of this equipment, an additional heavy burden on the tottering Cuban economy, is clear evidence of Cuban concern over the possibility of invasion, internal uprisings, and violations of air space and territorial waters, as well as of Soviet determination to maintain Castro in power. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 Sept 1962

Cubans May Plan Harassment of US Patrols

The buzzing of two US aircraft on routine patrol in the Florida Straits by a reported MIG-17 fighter on 8 September may indicate an increase in Cuban aggressiveness and plans for harassment of US patrols. (SECRET)

SOURCE: CINCLANT 082341Z (S); CINCLANT 090351Z (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~⁸²

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 Sept 1962

French Comment on Soviet Intention in Cuba

France considers the situation in Cuba to be "extremely serious," according to a French Foreign Office official. In commenting on Soviet objectives there, he stated that the Soviet buildup might be designed to increase pressure on the US at a time when Berlin was causing tension. Soviet moves in Berlin could then be matched by simultaneous activities in Cuba.

Moscow might also be establishing a strong base in Cuba, the official said, in order to provoke US protests so that the Soviets could open debate on the US having bases in Europe and the Middle East. Another aim, he remarked, might even be to push the US into taking some forceful action which would justify Soviet complaints or propaganda in the UN and other world forums.

Although the French report is speculative, the scope of Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests strongly that basic Soviet objectives do go beyond support of Castro. The Soviets probably see their actions as a means not only of extending their influence into a predominantly US sphere but of compounding Washington's international problems.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

SOURCE: EMB PARIS 1141 (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 Sep 1962

USSR Issues Warning to US Over Cuba

A TASS statement issued in Moscow on 11 September, containing a mixture of conciliatory and threatening statements, implied that the Soviet Union was prepared to attack the US with nuclear missiles in the event of a US attack on Cuba. It warned that such a train of events might well lead to a world nuclear conflict.

The statement appealed to the US not to lose its self-control and said that "one cannot now attack Cuba and expect that the aggressor will be free from punishment." It further stated that the Soviet Union was capable of giving aid from its own territory if any victim of a military attack requested help.

Referring to President Kennedy's request to Congress for power to call up 150,000 reservists, the article said that the Soviet Union had no intention of making a similar move; the Soviet Government, however, had instructed its Defense Ministry to bring the Soviet Army to the highest degree of fighting readiness. This was described as exclusively a precautionary measure.

The statement appealed to all nations to raise their voices against what it called the aggressive plans of the US in order to prevent the start of a war.

Comment: This is the same type of threat the Soviet Union had made on two previous occasions in demonstrating its support for the Cuban regime. In July 1962 Khrushchev implied that Soviet missiles would defend Cuba against any armed invasion. He later qualified the remark as symbolic. Again, after the rebel landings in Cuba in April 1961, Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union would give Cuba all necessary assistance to beat back any armed attack. The Soviet Union is now once more being careful not to commit itself to a direct defense of Cuba. The latest TASS statement is rather a move to demonstrate support for the Castro regime, to forestall any contemplated action by Cuban refugees similar to that of April 1961, and to create ill feeling on the part of neutralist nations against the US on the eve of the 17th UN General Assembly session. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: VARIOUS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

18 Sept 1962

Coastal Defense Missile Site in Cuba

A coastal defense cruise-missile site has been installed near Banes in Oriente Province, according to a reliable source. The site reportedly features two revetments, each containing a rail-launcher approximately 35 feet long. These launchers are connected by cable with a Soviet WHIFF-type radar and other electronic vans. Canvas-covered missile-transporters and other supporting equipment are also positioned within the site, which appears to be a field installation as opposed to a permanent facility.

The absence of significant military installations near Banes suggests that this is a training site. The construction of similar sites in other areas may be expected. The missile may have a range of up to 35 nautical miles.

~~(SECRET-NOFORN)~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 Sept 1962

SPOONREST Radar in Cuba

A signal from a surface-to-air-missile-associated radar, SPOONREST, has recently been intercepted from the Havana-Mariel area in Cuba. SPOONREST can intercept a medium bomber at 20,000 feet at a distance of 150 nautical miles. Primarily a warning-acquisition radar associated with the FRUITSET SA-2 guidance radar, SPOONREST operates in the very-high-frequency band with a radio frequency of 155-157 megacycles.

Intercept of a SPOONREST signal from Cuba indicates that at least one of the 12 SA-2 sites there will soon be operational. Cubans also have the FRUITSET radar, although no FRUITSET signals have yet been detected. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

SOURCE: [REDACTED] CINCLANT 171942Z (8)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

21 Sept 1962

Possible Sighting of Soviet Convoy Off the Bahamas with Two Surfaced Submarines

A Soviet "convoy" consisting of four ships and two surfaced submarines was reportedly sighted by a commercial tug at 1730 EDT on Thursday just west of Caicos passage in the Bahamas proceeding on a west-southwesterly course. The first ship was described as heavily loaded with troops, and the second, as laden with landing equipment and tanks. The remaining two ships were said to look like landing craft.

At approximately 0045 EDT today, CINCLANT reported that P2V surveillance had located five ships in the area concerned. It is likely that these five equate to those reported above as well as to several Soviet merchant ships earlier believed to be on their way to Cuba. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

SOURCE: CTG 81.7 210259Z (e); COMNAVBASE GTMO 210029Z (e);
CCGD 7 210445Z (U); CCGD7 210425Z (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

24 Sept 1962

More Guided Missile Patrol Boats for Cuba

The USSR has probably shipped additional KOMAR-class guided missile patrol boats to Cuba. Two Soviet cargo ships which recently arrived there had deck cargoes like those which came in August with deck-loaded KOMAR's. A third ship probably enroute Cuba is similarly loaded. These three ships could be carrying eight of the missile-launching patrol boats, which would give Cuba about 16 KOMAR's.

The accompanying photo of an earlier shipment to Cuba shows the crates on deck and their probable contents. (~~SECRET-NOFORN~~)

SOURCE: VARIOUS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

24 Sept 1962

Reports of Submarine Accompanying Soviet Merchant Ships to Cuba

No reliable information, apart from a disappearing radar contact of a US Navy P2V aircraft, supports the report of two submarines accompanying a group of four Soviet merchant ships heading toward Cuba. Intensive investigation of the area by US Naval forces has confirmed the presence of four Soviet dry cargo ships, one Soviet passenger ship and one Soviet tanker in the area but fails to substantiate submarines.

The source of the initial report, the commercial tug FORT JOHNSON, has provided exaggerated and distorted information on at least three occasions. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SOURCE: OPNAV BY TELEPHONE (Ø); COMASWFORLANT 210303Z (Ø)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

24 Sept 1962

Soviet Threat Over Cuba

Red Star on 21 September published another characteristic Soviet threat against the US in reaction to the US Senate resolution on Cuba the day before. The Soviets, as on previous occasions, did not commit themselves to a definite course of military action. Stress was placed on the readiness of the armed forces for battle "if the frantic aggressor should force us" into it.

The capability of Soviet nuclear submarines to put out to sea immediately and "bring down upon the enemy the inevitable might of rocket blows and strike with their accurate torpedoes" was emphasized. This sensitive outburst responds to Secretary of State Rusk's testimony early last week to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that US Armed Forces might intercept Cuban or Soviet arms shipments to other Latin American countries.

As in the 11 September Tass statement, the Red Star article is designed to demonstrate support for the Castro regime, to put the US on the propaganda defensive as a bullying enemy of world peace, to create ill feeling against the US among neutralist nations, to set the stage for a UN debate on Cuba, and to enable Moscow to take credit for frustrating alleged refugee or US plans for an attack. The threat of force is directed at cautious or worried elements in the US in the hope of restricting US policy while Castro strengthens his military and political position. ~~(SECRET)~~

SOURCE: PRESS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 Sept 1962

Third Coastal-Defense Missile Site Identified in Cuba

The site near Santa Cruz del Norte identified as an SA-2 missile site may be a coastal-defense cruise-missile site of the type identified at Banes. There are now 11 identified SA-2 sites, and there probably are or will be more.

A new facility has also been located about 10 nautical miles east of Havana, near Campo Florida, similar to the coastal-defense cruise-missile sites near Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte.

Equipment at the site near Campo Florida includes two unvetted canvas-covered probable launchers 175 feet apart, two probable vans, and seven canvas-covered trailer-type vans -- two of which are probably electronic associated. All of the equipment is interconnected by cable. Also within the enclosed area are six canvas-covered missile transporters, six trailer vans, four truck vans, four tents and seven unidentified pieces of equipment. Whether this is an operational missile site is not as yet clear. ~~(SECRET-NOFORN)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


27 Sept 1962

NATO Shipping to Cuba

Merchant ships under the flags of NATO nations made 227 voyages to Cuban ports between May and August 1962, of which 80 per cent were by ships of five countries whose governments asserted they lack authority to control shipping of non-strategic materials to Cuba. Official spokesmen for these countries -- Greece, the UK, Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands -- have also expressed reservations on the principle of such interference. Although Britain is unwilling to join in a general trade blockade of Cuba, British ship-owners, whose vessels rank second in number of trips to Cuba, were advised by the Government on 25 September to avoid carrying arms there. ~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

SOURCE: VARIOUS~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



28 Sept 1962

Additional Surface-to-Air Missile Facilities in Cuba

Three more SA-2 sites have been identified in Cuba -- all in Oriente Province. Confirmed air defense missile sites now number 14, although the site at Jiquani has no equipment emplaced.


The only missile support site reported thus far is at Santiago de las Vegas.

There has been considerable progress in the construction of the coastal-defense guided-missile site at Banes, and this site is reported as operational.

Comment: The appearance of these newly reported SA-2 sites in Oriente was expected, and -- as the Soviet arming of Cuba continues -- identification of other SA-2 sites and support facilities is anticipated. ~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~



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~~TOP SECRET~~




28 Sept 1962

SQUARE TIE Radar in Cuba

SQUARE TIE radar, believed used for surface surveillance, was recently intercepted from a KOMAR-class guided-missile boat operating out of Mariel, Cuba.

The Soviets reportedly have transferred at least 16 KOMAR-class guided-missile patrol boats to Cuba. SQUARE TIE which was sighted rotating when the intercept was made, is the only known radar on the KOMAR class.

SQUARE TIE radar is the first Soviet venture in X-band using a mesh reflector. Possible parameters are:



Additional antennas sighted on the KOMAR appeared to be SKI POLE (IFF transponder) and SQUARE HEAD (IFF interrogator) but no intercepts were obtained. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

SOURCE: 

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Oct 1962

Another SA-2 Site in Cuba

The 15th SA-2 missile site in Cuba has been identified on the Isle of Pines about 1,200 yards south of the Sigüanea Airfield runway. The site, which has a circular road and peripheral fence under construction, is described as having six missile launchers (four unrevetted, two with drive-through revetments) and a FRUITSET radar with associated vans and cables to all launchers. Several missile transporters are positioned about one-half mile to the south. The 15 sites are generally similar, each with a FRUITSET radar in the center of the six launchers. Some are believed operational.

Sigüanea Airfield's 6,000-foot runway and aprons were reported serviceable as of 29 September, and a 1,000-foot runway extension was under construction. There are two occupied light AA positions 2,000 yards southwest of the runway.

The cruise-type missile site at Banes seems to be operational. [redacted] the launch area revetments appear complete and that on 26 September a probable missile was located on one of the two launchers.

Santa Cruz del Norte is similar in equipment and configuration to Banes, but no missiles have been reported there. Campo Florida has certain equipment like that at Banes but does not have the deployed-site characteristics of either Banes or Santo Cruz del Norte.

The only missile support base reported so far is at Santiago de las Vegas, although there may be several more. About a month ago, Santiago de las Vegas had 34 missile transporters and 12 probable GUIDELINE missiles with associated equipment indicative of an SA-2 assembly area. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~




①

2 Oct 1962


A Cruise Missile Site Also on Isle of Pines

A cruise missile site -- the fourth detected in Cuba so far -- is under construction on the Isle of Pines, adjacent to the SA-2 installation identified previously. The site is similar to configuration and equipment to those at Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte and is located on a hilltop about a mile southwest of Sigüanea Airfield.

The site contains two inclined launchers, both connected by cable to a probable WHIFF radar and another unidentified radar. Behind the launchers are seven missile transporters and other vehicles. ~~(SECRET-NOFORN)~~



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

8 Oct 1962

Additional Torpedo Boats Probably on Way to Cuba

Two "P-6"-class Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) were noted as deck cargo aboard the Soviet dry cargo ship DVINOLES which recently left the Baltic. The ship has previously delivered military equipment to Cuba and in August carried two "Komar"-class Guided Missile Patrol Boats (PGMG) from the Baltic to Havana.

Delivery of the additional two "P-6" MTB's would bring to 14 the number received by the Castro regime. In addition to the MTB's, six "Kronshtadt"-class submarine chasers and at least 14 "Komar"-class PGMG have been delivered.
(~~SECRET~~-NOFORN)

SOURCE: ALUSNA COPENHAGEN 061615 (e)

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

8 Oct 1962

New Missile Site in Oriente Province, Cuba

A new SA-2 missile site has been identified two and a half miles SSE of Manzanillo in Oriente Province. The installation, the 16th located, reportedly has six missile transporters, six missile launchers, a FRUITSET radar with five vans and various other equipment in open storage. None of the equipment is revetted.

The SA-2 sites are at different stages, varying from early construction to possibly operational. The facility at Jiguani has much of the necessary equipment, but it is not yet emplaced in the familiar SA-2 circular configuration although the road pattern is there.

Three deployed coastal-defense cruise-missile sites have been confirmed; a fourth related facility, which may become a site, has been located. The Banes installation is probably partially operational while those at Santa Cruz del Norte and Sigüanea are in earlier stages of construction. The coastal defense missile-related facility at Campo Florida has equipment similar in configuration and layout to that of the other three, but has no fixed installations and lacks the deployed site pattern. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

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~~TOP SECRET~~



9 Oct 1962

Two More SA-2 Sites in Cuba

The 17th and 18th SA-2 sites in Cuba, apparently under construction, have been identified. One is southwest of Manati in Oriente Province, and other north-northeast of Senado in Camaguey. Both installations are unrevetted and appear to be of the familiar six-launcher pattern with FRUITSET radar. Twenty-five to 30 SA-2 installations probably would provide complete coverage for the island.
(~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)



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10 Oct 62

Cuban Refusal of Safe-Conduct Passes for Uruguayan Asylees

The military mission sent from Uruguay to Cuba to assist in the evacuation of asylees from the Uruguayan Embassy reports that the 340 asylees have not been evacuated because the Cuban Foreign Minister won't sign safe-conduct passes. Roa's refusal stems from Uruguay's opposition to Cuban attempts to enter the Latin American Free Trade Association.

Comment: The issue of the asylees and their safe-conduct passes is one over which Uruguay may decide to break relations with Cuba. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 Oct 1962

Two More SA-2 Sites in Cuba

The 19th and 20th SA-2 sites have been identified, both in Camaguey Province; one is northeast of Chambas, the other northwest of Esmeralda. The installations are unvetted and have the usual six launchers with FRUITSET radar. Construction at the Esmeralda site appears more advanced than at Chambas with the launchers, and possibly the acquisition radar, in place. (SECRET NOFORN)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 Oct 1962

Soviet Ship on Way to Cuba for Oceanographic Research

Radio Moscow announced that on 9 October the fisheries research ship OBZOR had left Kaliningrad for Cuba. Soviet scientists aboard are to carry out extensive research along the shores of Cuba to determine meteorological and hydrological conditions at the fishing grounds. Information gathered will be passed on to Cuban fishermen.

OBZOR cannot be further identified, but it is probably an OKEAN-class research trawler (508 GRT). OKEAN-class trawler OBDORSK left Kaliningrad in mid-September, went to Havana and is carrying on research in the Caribbean Sea about 200 miles southwest of Jamaica. It was announced last month that a Soviet fishing port would be built in Cuba and that the USSR would help to develop a Cuban fishing fleet.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: PRESS AND FILES~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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13 July

Summary Cable

Recent Soviet Arms Shipments

Two Soviet Dry Cargo Ships recently delivered arms to Iraq and Morocco respectively, while currently three Dry Cargo Ships are underway with possible additional military shipments for Cuba and Indonesia.

The Sukhona arrived Basra, Iraq on 22 June with military goods which included at least 17 tanks and 16 armored troop carriers. The Bolshevik Sukhanov arrived Casablanca, Morocco 27 June with an arms shipment which included MIG-17's and probably 18 tanks. This ship has since continued on to Cuba possibly carrying more arms to that country. Additionally the Dry Cargo Ship Zyryanin is now en route to Indonesia with two possible aircraft crates on deck and the Michurinsk was noted departing the Black Sea on the 11th. Destination unknown, with six personnel carriers on deck. (~~SECRET~~)

107
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 July

Summary Cable

Cuba to Receive Five Soviet Trawlers

A group of five Soviet Okean-Class Medium Refrigerated Fishing Trawlers (502 GRT each) arrived Havana, Cuba 18 July for delivery to that country after the Soviet crews have trained Cuban fishermen in their operation. This transaction is part of the 1962 Cuban-Soviet Trade Treaty.

The ships, all subordinate to the Baltic Fish Trust, will be used for six months to train Cuban crews and search for fish in the Caribbean area. This will mark the first appearance of Soviet Fishing Trawlers there. Each ship arrived with a crew of 28 Soviet fishermen, all of whom will most likely return home in February. (See DIA INTSUM item of 11 July 1962.) (~~SECRET~~)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 September

Summary Cable

Cuban Military Alert Relaxed

The Cuban military alert, in force since the end of August, was evidently relaxed in at least some army units on 4 September and in the Navy on 5 September. Although messages of 30 August and 2 and 3 September reported possible landings in Orient and Las Villas provinces, there is not evidence confirming such landings. Alpha 66, an Anti-Castro group located in Puerto Rico with branches in the U.S., reportedly plans military action against Cuba some time before 22 September.

Comment: The military alert throughout the Island has probably been relaxed since the widespread uprising - rumored for late August - did not materialize. Various exile groups continue to plan action, however, and additional raids similar to the firing on Havana, may be attempted at any time. (~~TOP SECRET~~)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ 20 September
Summary CableReferences to Bloc "Volunteers" for Cuba

Recent references to "Volunteers" for Cuba in Eastern Europe are believed to be indicative of enlisted personnel's reaction to political briefings on Cuba and to troop indoctrination through calls for "volunteers". The Soviets can be expected to send additional military specialists to train Cubans in the more sophisticated weapons and to maintain the equipment. The references among Soviet troops to "volunteers" however appear to be an aspect of Moscow's propaganda campaign.

Using the 11 September TASS statement as a take-off point, Cuba evidently is a major topic at political gatherings of Soviet military personnel in Eastern Europe. (~~TOP SECRET~~)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ 22 September
Summary CableSurface-To-Surface Missile Site in Cuba

The probable surface-to-surface cruise missile facility at Banes, Cuba, reported in INTSUM 18 September, appears to be a short range Naval Associated Coastal Defense Installation of Soviet origin. There are similarities in the description of the Banes facility and recently photographed sites at Lien Shan and Port Arthur, China. The major dissimilarity appears to be in the permanence of the China sites and the field type nature of the Banes site. The Banes site has not, at this time been directly associated with any specific known missile system. Characteristics and performance of the missile have not been determined but a range not in excess of 25/35 NM is considered likely. The vehicle may be in the 4,000 lbs class, with a warhead weight of around 1,000 lbs.

There are no known significant installations in the Banes area which would seem to require shore defense. This, and the field type nature of the site, suggest it may be for troop training.

An intensive study is being made of all available data by a GMAIC working group. Further assessment is expected by early October

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111

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28 September

Summary Cable

Additional Soviet Military Aircraft Delivered
to Cuba

Two Soviets ships with a total deck cargo of 22 to 24 crates, probably containing MIG-type aircraft, arrived in Cuba during the week ending 6 September. Both ships originated from the Blatic. The first, Michurinsk, arrived in Havana on 30 August with nine crates; and the second, Divnogorsk arrived in Havana on 6 September with 13 to 15 crates. Prior to these deliveries there were an estimated 60 MIG-type aircraft in Cuba. Of these, one MIG-21 was sighted in early September at Santa Clara Airfield along with its crates which may also have contained MIG-21s. (FISHBEDS). (SECRET NOFORN).

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~18 August
Bulletin CableChicom Troops Reported in Cuba

According to the Commander of the Naval Base, Guantanamo, previous indications that a large number of fully equipped Chinese Communist troops are in the area of Nicaro, Preston, and Antilla are quite accurate. Between 500 and 1,000 Chinese had reportedly arrived in Cuba about 1 August.

COMNAVBASE comments that the reason for the presence of the Chinese, in Oriente Province in particular, is that Cuban authorities have had difficulty in keeping Army/Militia troops from defecting and/or aiding counter-revolutionary groups. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]18 August
Bulletin CableSoviet ECM Equipment Identified in Cuba

Recent observations indicate the USSR may be equipping Cuba with electronic countermeasure equipment apparently containing CHEESE BRICK--a land-based X-band radar jammer used against airborne targets, effective to approximately 30 miles.

On 9 August, a convoy of 12 Soviet G42-63 vehicles operated by Soviet or Bloc personnel was observed parked near Sancti Spiritus. On 12 August a convoy of 24 of the same type vehicles was observed near Pinar del Rio. Each convoy was followed by a small olive green bus carrying about 30 Soviet or Bloc personnel (non-Chinese).

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 September 1962

Additional Reports of Hostility By Cuban Patrol Boats.

During the night of 31 August--1 September Cuban patrol craft periodically illuminated the bridge of the USS OXFORD with powerful carbon arc searchlights. The OXFORD is operating in coastal waters seven to twenty miles north of the Cuban coast conducting special surveillance of the Havana area.

Another report discloses that on 30 August Cuban patrol vessels trained their guns on US patrol aircraft but did not fire. This latter report is not to be confused with the incident the afternoon of 30 August when a US naval aircraft was fired on by a Cuban patrol boat. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ 9 September 1962
Bulletin CablePossible Strike at Cuba by Anti-Castro Organization

a boat left Miami on 7 September for a strike at Havana on the night of 8 or 9 September. Further details of the strike were not available.

One of the aims of the strike, which is being conducted by the ALPHA 66 organization, is to rally money and support from among various groups outside Cuba. ~~(SECRET)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

17 September 1962
Bulletin Cable

SPOONREST Radar Located at Cuban SAM Site

On 15 September ELINT intercept of a missile associated SPOONREST radar was noted on a D/F bearing which passed through the coordinates of a confirmed surface-to-air missile site located at Mariel (23-00-55N, 82-49-30W).

Comment: The appearance of SPOONREST radar probably at the Mariel SAM site suggests this site may possibly be operational. (~~SECRET~~ NOFORN)

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~~TOP SECRET~~29 September 1962
Bulletin CableStatus of Missile Sites in Cuba

The cruise-type missile site at Banes seems to be operational. Reliable sources say that the launch area re-ventments appear complete and that on 26 September a probable missile was located on one of the two launchers.

Santa Cruz del Norte is similar in equipment and configuration to Banes, but no missiles have been reported there. Campo Florida has certain equipment like that at Banes but does not have the deployed-site characteristics of either Banes or Santa Cruz del Norte.

The only missile support base reported so far is at Santiago de las Vegas, although there may be several more. About a month ago, Santiago de las Vegas had 34 missile transporters and 12 probable GUIDLINE missiles with associated equipment indicative of an SA-2 assembly area.

~~(SECRET-NOFORN)~~

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ANNEX I

EXTRACTS FROM THE DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY


This annex contains extracts from the Diplomatic Summary. It has a wide dissemination throughout the intelligence community and is transmitted electrically to selected U. S. embassies and USIB representatives stationed abroad.

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ANNEX I

Extracts from the Diplomatic Summary : 26 Jul 62




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
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
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
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
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
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
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ANNEX J

Excerpts from State Department Research Memoranda
and Intelligence Notes

(1) RM-INR-58 - February 26, 1962, "Czechoslovak Support for
Castro in Cuba and Latin America."

"Military assistance. Only the USSR and Czechoslovakia have given significant military assistance to Cuba. Czechoslovakia made the first delivery of military goods from the bloc, sending small arms and helicopters in the summer of 1960, shortly after announcing its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. Since 1960 Czechoslovakia has provided most of Cuba's 200,000 small arms and portable weapons while the Soviets have concentrated on aircraft and heavy fighting equipment. The Czechs have trained in their country most of the pilots for Cuba's 75 Soviet-built MIG's, and, in addition, have provided instructors and maintenance personnel for the Cuban armed forces."

(2) RM-RSB-87 - April 20, 1962, "Moscow Backs Castro Against
Veteran Cuban Communists."

This RM analyzes a Pravda editorial of April 11 concerning a speech by Castro attacking old-line Cuban communists. The RM comments that the editorial clearly serves notice on the Cuban communists that Moscow is firmly supporting Castro as the leader of the Cuban revolution. It constitutes the most forthright recognition by Moscow to date of the Castro regime's claim to being communist and thus a bona fide member of
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the world communist system. At the same time, however, it does not undertake a Soviet commitment to ensure the Cuban regime's security despite recognition of the latter's communist attributes.

(3) On April 30, 1962, INR/RSB began a monthly review of bloc relations with Latin America. The first of which covered the period March 16 - April 15, 1962.

(4) RM-RSB-113 - June 7, 1962, "Soviet Theory of the "National Democratic State:" A Communist Program for Less-Developed Areas."

In this Research Memorandum it was noted that the Soviets yielded in part to Castro's wish for recognition as a true communist state and that "the 1962 Soviet May Day slogans, published on April 15, hailed the people of Cuba as having 'embarked on the path of building socialism' -- a distinction accorded to no other nonbloc country."

(5) IN June 14, 1962 Subject: Khrushchev Remarks Imply Need for Soviet Missile Buildup.

"Khrushchev used a new formulation in assessing the US-Soviet military balance in his recent talk with Italian Trade Minister Preti. He reportedly said that the Soviet Union was not stronger than the US but certainly not weaker either.....Khrushchev's seemingly greater realism about the strategic balance combined with his deprecation of ground troops suggests that he remains reluctant to maintain the 'mass army' urged by his defense experts while simultaneously undertaking the buildup of Soviet nuclear and missile capability to which he would give highest priority."

(6) RM-RSB-75.3

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(6) RM-RSB-75.3, June 27, 1962 Subject: Bloc Relations with Latin America, May 15-June 15, 1962.

"The withdrawal of Soviet Ambassador Kudryavtsev from Cuba came in the wake of disagreement between Moscow and Havana over how to deal with Cuba's domestic difficulties, but statements by Khrushchev and Cuban leaders indicated a desire on both sides to maintain close ties."

Commenting on Khrushchev's June 2 speech the RM noted: "Khrushchev's speech was replete with praise for the Castro regime and the Cuban leader personally, and he promised to continue Soviet assistance in weaponry as well as in the economic field."

(7) RM-RSB-75.4, August 3, 1962 Subject: Bloc Relations with Latin America, June 15-July 15, 1962.

"Raul Castro's mission to Moscow, presumably to discuss Soviet military assistance to Cuba, probably ended inconclusively and perhaps acrimoniously.".....Cuban Deputy Premier and Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro spent two weeks in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Defense Ministry. Accompanied by some ten 'prominent' Cuban military officers, Castro presumably went there to discuss Soviet military assistance to Cuba. The results of his visit remain largely unknown..... It seems likely, however, that the main purpose of the visit was to seek a greater Soviet commitment to maintain the Castro regime."

(8) RM-RSB-75.5, Sept. 13, 1962 Subject: Bloc Relations with Latin America, July 16-August 15, 1962.

"The major development in bloc relations with Latin America during the period was a significant increase in Soviet military and economic shipments

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shipments to Cuba. Moscow's policy was apparently designed to bolster the Castro regime both internally and against any external threat, and represented a deepening of Soviet involvement with that regime.....

Beginning in late July, Soviet shipments to Cuba doubled, and a large volume of the increased shipments was known to consist of arms and military technicians. The remainder of the shipments was composed of economic assistance, Soviet experts destined to help invigorate the Cuban economy, and Cuban agricultural personnel returning from training in the Soviet Union..... The increased Soviet economic and military commitment to Cuba is new and significant evidence of the value Moscow places on the Castro regime as a serious threat to US prestige and position in this hemisphere. The commitment also deepens Soviet involvement in the fortunes of the Castro regime."

(9) RM-RSB-1149, August 25, 1962 Subject: Soviet Military Shipments to Cuba.

"About one dozen of the cargo ships are believed to be carrying military equipment -- electronic equipment such as radar, motor transport, construction equipment, and tracked vehicles -- some of which has been observed in Cuba. Information on construction sites in Cuba suggests that surface-to-air missiles may have been included in the military equipment delivered, but there is no hard evidence on this score.....The most likely Soviet motivation in providing military assistance and personnel to Cuba is to enhance the Cuban regime's defense capabilities against an external threat and increase the effectiveness of the military establishment for possible internal use.....Moreover, the Soviets doubtless believe that
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their military assistance will serve to deter any intervention not overtly involving US forces.....We doubt that the immediate timing of the Soviet deliveries to Cuba is specifically related to the latest Soviet moves in Berlin. Because of the lead time necessary to get such shipments in route, the decision to send them must have been made several months ago. We do, however, think that there may be a broad relationship: the Soviets may believe that US attention to Berlin will be diluted by evidence of Soviet activity in another sensitive region and they may calculate that in an atmosphere of generally heightened tension pressures for Western concessions can be stimulated."

(10) RM-INR-82, Sept. 1, 1962 Subject: The Meaning of Increased Soviet Aid to Cuba.

"The recent increased Soviet economic and military commitment to Cuba is new and significant evidence of the value Moscow places on the Castro regime as a serious threat to US prestige and position in this Hemisphere.....In addition to training and arming Castro's forces, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba. But we believe that at present such activities are likely to be limited to the setting up of unacknowledged intelligence collection and defensive facilities. They will attempt to derive propaganda advantage by comparing their 'peaceful' presence in Cuba with US bases in Turkey and Iran.....More risky, and politically less justifiable, would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases or pads for missile capable of reaching adjacent countries. We

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believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence for the foreseeable future. In sum, we think there is some possibility that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time. It should be noted in this connection that presently available information makes it extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder estimate must await more clearcut evidence."

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(11) RM-RSB-153, Sept. 11, 1962 Subject: Moscow Warns US on Cuba;
Dampens Pressure on Berlin

"Coming at the time of massive deliveries of military equipment to Cuba, the Soviet statement represents a step beyond Moscow's previous commitments to defend Cuba against 'aggression', though it falls short of the explicit commitments contained in Soviet alliances with Bloc countries... Moscow's immediate purpose is undoubtedly to deter a whole range of potential actions against Castro by the US alone or in coordination with other Latin American countries. At the same time, after US assurances that no military attack is planned, Moscow probably hopes that it will have another opportunity to claim (as it did at the time of Suez and the off-shore island crises) that its warnings forestalled 'imperialist aggression!'"

(12) RM-RSB-155, Sept. 14, 1962 Subject: Soviet Public Statements with
Respect to Cuban Security

This memorandum analyzes the recent Soviet public statements with respect to Cuban security: "First, Moscow's acceptance last April of Castro's foreful assertion on March 26 of his personal leadership of a communist regime in Cuba, though reluctant, was tantamount to acknowledgment of that regime as a bona fide if junior member of the international communist family. The Soviet obligation to sustain the Cuban regime increased accordingly. The second development increasing Moscow's commitment to ensure the security of the Cuban regime has been the recent Soviet military arms assistance to Cuba, beginning ⁱⁿ late July, followed by the Soviet-Cuba September 2 communique

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publicly acknowledging the military assistance, and the September 11 Soviet Government statement accusing the US of aggressive designs on Cuba and renewing general promises of Soviet support for the latter.."

(13) RM-RAR-36, Sept. 19, 1962 Subject: Summary of Recent Soviet Military Assistance to Cuba

"Since July when the volume of Soviet military shipments to Cuba suddenly increased very substantially, between 65 and 75 shiploads of various military items, supplies, and personnel have arrived. More ships are enroute. In part the Soviet shipments have consisted of types of weapons previously delivered to the Cuban armed forces including more tanks, self-propelled guns and other ground force equipment. The major tonnage however has been devoted to supplying SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) together with all of the related gear and equipment necessary for their installation and operation. To date 12 SAM sites have been established in the western end of the island. In addition, one missile site of a different type has been emplaced on the north coast toward the eastern end of the island at Banes. The site is similar to known Soviet coastal defense missile sites and is believed to accommodate an anti-shipping missile with a range of 20-35 miles.... There is a considerable amount of new equipment which has not been precisely identified but it is believed to include a large quantity of electronic gear."

(14) RM-RSB-145, Sept. 18, 1962 Subject: The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive through June 30, 1962

This Research Memorandum analyzes the growing magnitude of

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Communist Bloc aid generally and includes a section on Cuba, noting the large extension of credit and aid to Cuba for use during the period 1961-1965.

(15) RM-RSB-75.6, Oct. 5, 1962 Subject: Bloc Relations with Latin America August 16-September 15, 1962

"The Soviet-Cuban communique of September 2 and the Soviet Government statement of September 11 announcing expansion of military and economic aid to Cuba amounted to a significant increase in Soviet involvement with the fortunes of the Castro regime and served to underscore that regime's affiliation with the communist bloc."

(16) RM-RSB-165, Oct. 9, 1962 Subject: Military and Economic Implications of Soviet-Cuban Fishing Agreement

This Research Memorandum analyzes the implications of a Soviet-Cuban fishing agreement signed on September 25 as another significant step in Moscow's role in Cuba, particularly noting its military significance, "since it will facilitate and expand Soviet naval intelligence operations by specially equipped trawlers ... it will provide a useful supplementary base for servicing small naval craft ... On balance, the agreement may be considered another link in Moscow's military buildup in Cuba, differing from her recent developments in that it will be uniquely covered as a legitimate economic enterprise and will provide the USSR with important information on US defenses."

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