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Subject: Results of Direct CIA Contact with BND Source "Curveball"

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source on Iraq's mobile BW production program - codenamed "Curveball" - indicate that he is unreliable because he fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project, substantially weakening the intelligence case that Iraq had a mobile BW agent production program. Curveball, an Iraqi chemical engineer, was a German Intelligence Service (BND) source [redacted]. The BND provided the vast majority of Curveball's reporting to the USG [redacted] beginning in early 2000. U.S. intelligence agencies were not permitted to debrief Curveball directly on his mobile BW reporting until March 2004.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

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In mid-March 2004, the German BND allowed [redacted] CIA [redacted]

[redacted] direct access to debrief Curveball on his mobile BW reporting for the first time after being presented with information obtained from the Iraq Survey Group in Baghdad contradicting some of Curveball's earlier claims. Over the course of the debriefings, Curveball provided little in the way of clarifying the contradictions in his reporting and stood firmly by his previous comments.

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Over the three days of debriefings, Curveball demonstrated through his verbal responses to questions and his demeanor that his reporting of events that took place after 1995 is unreliable. We are certain that he did not have direct access after May 1997 to the Djerf al Naddaf site, which was where he alleged a transportable BW production system was periodically housed. [redacted] has provided the Director of the Defense HUMINT Service (DH) with a memorandum summarizing the results of the debriefings. Based on the results of these debriefings, [redacted] DH have recalled all reports disseminated. We have also advised [redacted] BND of our actions. [redacted] plans to continue to work with [redacted] BND to further clarify issues surrounding this case.

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Curveball's demeanor during the debriefings was strongly indicative of a well rehearsed story. We are considering several possibilities to explain how Curveball could have created his story, including complete fabrication based on his education and experience as a chemical engineer, familiarity with some design documents and fabrication of subsequent detail based on existing persons and organizations.

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[redacted] We cannot discount the possibility that he was coached by other parties [redacted] Clearly, however, until/unless Curveball admits he lost access [redacted] we cannot resolve this issue.

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Curveball's reporting was also the basis for our assessment that the two trailers found by Coalition forces last year probably were intended for BW agent production, based largely on their similarity to the plants he described.

- CIA analysts are now uncertain about the intended use of the trailers, although they still judge that the trailers would be capable of producing biological agents after minor modifications.
- The scientists who designed and tested the trailers claim they were intended to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons, according to our military. CIA and the National Ground Intelligence Center are skeptical, in part because another Iraqi military officer says fixed sites were used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons and we have documents [redacted] that show Iraq had other, more efficient mobile hydrogen production systems.
- DIA has concluded that the trailers are not suitable for production of BW agent based on a technical exploitation of the trailers but were probably designed for a chemical process like the production of hydrogen.

We are trying to determine the veracity of other, fragmentary reporting that indicated Iraq may have been pursuing transportable fermentation systems for BW agent production. We will remain engaged with [redacted] BND as they continue to debrief Curveball to try to determine if he fabricated his entire story or whether his reporting was based on an element of truth. [redacted]

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